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Chapter 1: “Bank equity and macroprudential policy”
This chapter proposes an alternative macroprudential policy in the framework of Gertler,
Kiyotaki and Queralto (2012). In their model, the central bank subsidizes bank outside
equity, where the subsidy rate is determined by the shadow cost of the deposit. We
find that the alternative rule in which the subsidy rate responds to the aggregate bank
outside equity ratio is welfare improving because it has a better stabilization effect on
the bank asset deterioration after a financial shock. We disentangle different channels
through which macroprudential policies affect the economy and demonstrate that the
better stabilization in the post-crisis economy has a positive effect on the economy in
normal times through security prices.
Published in the Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 2016
Chapter 2: “Stationarity of Econometric Learning with Bounded Memory and a
Predicted State Variable” (Joint work with Tatiana Damjanovic, Sarunas Girdenas)
In this chapter, we consider a model where producers set their prices based on their
prediction of the aggregated price level and an exogenous variable, which can be a
demand or a cost-push shock. To form their expectations, they use OLS-type econo-
metric learning with bounded memory. We show that the aggregated price follows the
random coefficient autoregressive process and we prove that this process is covariance
stationary.
Published in Economics Letters, 2015
6Chapter 3: “A comment on:“Capital regulation and monetary policy with fragile
banks”” (Joint work with Yoske Igarashi)
This chapter comments on Angeloni and Faia (2013, Journal of Monetary Economics),
a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with a risky banking sector. We iden-
tify the sources of inefficiency in the model and disentangle the channels through which
banks choose a high level of leverage. We explain that their assumptions that gen-
erate banks over-borrowing feature lead to the return on assets and the bankruptcy
probability that are unrealistically high. Next, we modify the model by incorporating
the banking sector of Gertler and Karadi (2011) into the AF model and show that the
calibration result improves.
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Chapter 1
Bank Equity and Macroprudential
Policy
Abstract
This paper proposes an alternative macroprudential policy in the framework of Gertler,
Kiyotaki and Queralto (2012). In their model, the central bank subsidizes bank outside
equity, where the subsidy rate is determined by the shadow cost of the deposit. We
find that the alternative rule in which the subsidy rate responds to the aggregate bank
outside equity ratio is welfare improving because it has a better stabilization effect on
the bank asset deterioration after a financial shock. We disentangle different channels
through which macroprudential policies affect the economy and demonstrate that the
better stabilization in the post-crisis economy has a positive effect on the economy in
normal times through security prices.
Keywords: Macroprudential Policy, Bank Equity, DSGE Model
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1.1 Introduction
The financial crisis in 2009 aroused considerable attention to macroprudential policies,
which aim at the resilience of the financial system to macroeconomic shocks. Many
studies show that individual banks do not internalize the importance of bank capital
ratio for the stability of the banking sector,1 so there is a role that macroprudential poli-
cies can play. A variety of macroprudential policies have been proposed in the literature,
and most of them suggest a high bank capital ratio in normal times and countercyclical
capital requirements.2 But when the economy is hit by a financial crisis, how should
the central bank quantitatively adjust the capital requirement over time? This paper
addresses this question by using the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE)
framework developed in Gertler, Kiyotaki and Queralto (2012) (GKQ hereafter). One
advantage of their model is that it incorporates financial intermediaries into a quanti-
tative macroeconomic model. In their framework, banks make an endogenous decision
on asset holding, leverage, and the liability structure. The model is rich enough to
analyze financial propagation quantitatively through bank borrowing constraint and
risk-taking behavior, and thereby it enables one to investigate the effect of different
macroprudential policy rules.
In their model, firms’ physical capital can only be funded by banks. Banks do not
have enough net worth and have to borrow from households by issuing deposits and
bank outside equity. The model further assumes that bankers have the potential to
divert a fraction of the bank assets. The fraction of the assets that banks can divert
increase with the ratio of the bank outside equity to assets. Because of this potential
moral hazard, bankers face a twofold borrowing constraint. First, there is a limit to the
amount of assets that a bank can fund with a given amount of net worth. Second, the
borrowing constraint becomes tighter when the bank issues too much outside equity.
1For example, Lorenzoni (2008), Bianchi (2011), Korinek (2011) and Stein (2012).
2For instance, time-varying capital requirements are analyzed by Kashyap and Stein (2004) and
Dewatripont and Tirole (2012). Admati et al. (2010) and Hanson et al. (2011) suggest that banks
maintain a capital ratio that is substantially higher than that determined by the market. See also
other recent papers, e.g., Perotti and Suarez (2009), Elliott (2011), Borio and Zhu (2012), and Galati
and Moessner (2012).
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In the GKQ framework, banks prefer outside equity financing to deposits financing.
Outside equity has a hedging effect for the bank because its cash-outflows are matched
with the cash-inflows from the bank assets. When a financial shock leads to a deteriora-
tion of the bank assets, outside equity can absorb part of the bank’s loss, so that it has
a stabilizing effect on asset prices and production in the economy. However, the bank
does not fully internalize the stabilizing effect of outside equity. As a result, the bank
chooses a fraction of outside equity which is lower than the socially desirable level.
GKQ show that this problem can be overcome by a macroprudential policy which
subsidizes and promotes the issuance of the bank outside equity. The policy helps
banks internalize the hedging effect of outside equity. Another implication of such a
policy is that the bank capital ratio is high in normal times and low in bad times, so
the policy has an effect that is similar to a ‘countercyclical capital requirement’. Also,
such a policy has the side benefit that it enhances the equilibrium value of the bank
net worth, partially relaxing the borrowing constraint. Thus, the bank can fund more
bank assets than that under the no-policy regime.
This paper proposes an alternative macroprudential policy in the GKQ framework.
The alternative policy differs from that of GKQ in the way the equity subsidy rate is
determined. In the GKQ rule, the subsidy responds inversely to the shadow cost of the
deposit issuance to indirectly affect the outside equity-to-asset ratio. In our rule, the
subsidy responds directly to the aggregate level of the outside equity-to-asset ratio. It
has two advantages: first, the equity-to-asset ratio is a more practical measure because
it is easier to observe than the shadow cost of the deposit; second, as we demonstrate,
the subsidy responding to the aggregate equity-to-asset ratio achieves higher welfare.
The alternative rule improves welfare for two reasons. First, it has a better sta-
bilization effect on bank assets after the economy is hit by a financial shock. It is
because the subsidy rate reacts to shocks more strongly than the GKQ rule after the
shock, reducing the outside equity subsidy more. The lower subsidy results in a lower
outside equity ratio, encouraging more deposit issuance in bad times. In other words,
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our rule is more in line with the countercyclical capital requirements in Hanson et al.
(2011). It has the following implications: as in the GKQ rule, banks should keep a high
equity-to-asset ratio in normal times to hedge the financial risk; and unlike the GKQ
rule, the central bank should allow for more deposit issuance in bad times to stabilize
the economy. The quantitative effect of the alternative rule in bad times is consistent
with the macroprudential capital policy tool of the Bank of England (Harimohan and
Nelson (2012)).
Second, our policy rule has the side benefit that the bank assets and production in
normal times are slightly higher than under the GKQ rule. It means that the better
stabilization effect is not at the cost of production and consumption in normal times.
Indeed, the level of outside equity subsidy under our rule is similar to that of the GKQ
rule. But our rule achieves a higher level of bank assets in the pre-crisis economy because
the better post-shock stabilization effect improves the bank’s condition in normal times.
The results show that our policy raises the bank’s private value of the net worth to a
higher level. It results in a higher leverage and hence, a higher level of total bank assets.
Our analysis sheds light on the indirect effect of the macroprudential policy on security
prices and demonstrates that the stabilization of policy has a significant positive effect
on the pre-crisis economy.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 1.2 describes the model
and the macroprudential policy. Section 1.3 shows simulation results and analyzes the
performances of different policy rules. Section 1.4 concludes the paper.
1.2 The Model
The framework is from GKQ. It is a DSGE model with financial frictions. There are
four sectors in the model: households, goods producers, capital producers, and banks.
The summary of the system of equations is shown in Appendix 1.5.1.
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1.2.1 Resource Constraints
The resource constraint of the economy is
Yt = Ct +
[
1 + f
(
It
It−1
)]
It, (1.1)
where Yt is domestic final output, Ct is consumption, and It is investment. Here f(·)
is an adjustment cost function of investment with f(1) = f ′(1) = 0 and f ′′(x) > 0,
∀x > 0.3
Following GKQ, the financial crisis is modelled as a negative exogenous shock to
the aggregate physical capital stock:
Kt+1 = ψt+1St, (1.2)
St = (1− δ)Kt + It, (1.3)
where Kt+1 is the aggregate capital stock at the beginning of time t + 1, St is the
accumulated aggregate capital at the end of time t, and ψt+1 is the capital quality
shock from time t to t+ 1. The shock ψt+1 (> 0) is an i.i.d. process with unconditional
mean 1. Eq. (1.3) is the capital accumulation function and δ is the depreciation rate.
1.2.2 Households
A representative household has a continuum of members with mass 1, where ζ fraction
of the members are workers and 1 − ζ fraction are bankers. Workers supply labor to
firms to gain wages. Bankers work as bank managers, make decisions on the bank
balance sheet and get paid by bank dividends when they are forced to exit the banking
sector. In each period, bankers have probability σ of exiting the banking sector to
become workers, and workers become new bankers with probability (1−σ)(1−ζ)
ζ
. In this
way, the ratio of bankers to workers remains constant over time.
3In the simulation, we follow GKQ and specify f as a quadratic function: f(x) = Ψ (x− 1)2.
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The expected discounted lifetime utility of the household takes the form4
Et
∞∑
τ=t
βτ−tU (Cτ , Cτ−1, Lτ ) = Et
∞∑
τ=t
βτ−t
1
1− γ
(
Cτ − hCτ−1 − χ
1 + ϕ
L1+ϕτ
)1−γ
,
(1.4)
where Et (·) denotes the expectation conditional on the information set at time t, Lt
is the labor supply, β is the time discount factor, γ is risk aversion, h is the habit
parameter, χ is the weight parameter of labor, and ϕ is the inverse Frisch labor elasticity.
It is assumed that households do not lend any funds directly to firms. They can
only lend to banks. Households can choose to buy either risk-free debt (deposits, Dt)
or bank outside equity (et). The household maximizes her expected utility by choosing
consumption, labor supply, deposits and outside equity subject to the budget constraint:
Ct +Dt + qtet = WtLt + Πt +RtDt−1 +Re,tqt−1et−1, (1.5)
where Wt is the wage rate, Πt is the profit transfer from capital producers and banks,
qt is the price of the bank equity, Rt is the gross risk-free return on deposits, and Re,t
is the gross return on bank equity from time t − 1 to t. Let UC,t denote the marginal
utility to consume and Λt,τ the stochastic discount factor from time t to τ :
UC,t ≡
(
Ct − hCt−1 − χ
1 + ϕ
L1+ϕt
)−γ
− βh
(
Ct+1 − hCt − χ
1 + ϕ
L1+ϕt+1
)−γ
, (1.6)
Λt,τ ≡ βτ−tUC,τ
UC,t
. (1.7)
The optimality condition implies the Euler equations and the labor supply function:
Rt+1Et (Λt,t+1) = 1, (1.8)
Et (Λt,t+1Re,t+1) = 1, (1.9)
4The utility function follows Guvenen (2009) and Greenwood, Hercowitz and Huffman (1988).
First, there is no wealth effect on labor supply. Second, it produces labor volatility with little cost of
complexity. Third, habit formation improves the quantitative performance of the model.
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EtUCtWt = χ
(
Ct − hCt−1 − χ
1 + ϕ
L1+ϕ−γt
)
Lϕt . (1.10)
1.2.3 Goods Producers
Competitive goods producers (henceforth ‘firms’) accumulate physical capital and pro-
duce identical final output using capital and labor. It is assumed that firms lack funds
and hence, have to borrow from banks by issuing firm equity. They borrow without
any friction by committing to pay the entire profit to banks. The production function
is
Yt = AtK
α
t L
1−α
t , 0 < α < 1, (1.11)
where At denotes aggregate productivity. For simplicity, it is assumed that At = A = 1.
5
The first order condition with respect to labor is
Wt = (1− α)Yt
Lt
. (1.12)
Let Zt denote the gross profit per unit of capital held by the firm:
Zt =
Yt −WtLt
Kt
= α
Yt
Kt
= αA
(
Lt
Kt
)1−α
. (1.13)
Since all profits go to banks via firm equity, firms have no profit left in each period.
The return on the firm equity is
Rk,t =
[Zt + (1− δ)Qt]ψt
Qt−1
, (1.14)
where Qt is the price of capital. We normalize the firm equity so that it corresponds to
one unit of capital. Under such normalization, Zt is equal to the profit per unit of firm
equity and Qt is also the price of the firm equity. Similarly, the bank outside equity is
5By assuming this, GKQ focus on the impact of the capital quality shock (i.e., ‘crisis’) and stabi-
lization of the financial system. We follow GKQ and abstract from normal business cycle shock.
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entitled to one unit of the bank asset, so the return on the bank equity is
Re,t =
(Zt + (1− δ)qt)ψt
qt−1
. (1.15)
1.2.4 Capital Producers
Capital producers produce capital with flow-variable adjustment costs. They transfer
their profit back to households in each period because households have the ownership.
Given the capital price Qt, capital producers choose investment It to maximize their
profit:
maxEt
∞∑
τ=t
Λt,τ
{
QτIτ − Iτ
[
1 + f(
Iτ
Iτ−1
)
]}
.
In the optimum, the marginal cost of capital production equals the price of capital:
Qt = 1 + f(
It
It−1
) +
It
It−1
f ′(
It
It−1
)− Et
[
Λt,t+1
(
It+1
It
)2
f ′(
It+1
It
)
]
. (1.16)
1.2.5 Banks
In this section, we introduce the banking sector and the central bank macroprudential
policy. Banks issue outside equity (et) to households and take deposits (dt) from them,
lend money to firms, and keep profits as net worth (nt).
6 As in GKQ, the central
bank implements a macroprudential policy which taxes the bank assets and subsidizes
the bank outside equity. With such macroprudential policy, the bank balance sheet
condition is
(1 + τ kt )Qtst = nt + (1 + τ
e
t )qtet + dt, (1.17)
where st is the firm equity that banks buy from goods producers, τ
k
t is the tax on each
unit of bank asset, and τ et is the subsidy for bank outside equity. The baseline model
(i.e., ‘no-policy regime’) is a special case that both τ kt and τ
e
t are zero.
6In GKQ, the following two assumptions ensure that banks do not have sufficiently high net worth
to avoid borrowing from households. First, new bankers do not hold sufficient net worth when they
enter the banking sector. Second, banks have a constant probability of exiting the banking sector in
every period.
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The GKQ policy and our alternative policy differ in the way in which the subsidy
level τ et is chosen. Once τ
e
t is chosen, the tax level τ
k
t is determined by the fiscal
neutrality of the macroprudential policy,
τ kt = Xtτ
e
t , (1.18)
where Xt is the aggregate counterpart of the individual level of the outside equity-to-
asset ratio,7
xt =
qtet
Qtst
. (1.19)
Define the bank leverage ratio φt as the ratio of bank assets to net worth,
φt =
Qtst
nt
. (1.20)
A law of motion of an individual bank’s net worth is
nt = Rk,tQt−1st−1 −Rtdt−1 −Re,tqt−1et−1. (1.21)
The objective of a banker is to maximize his expected discounted value of the bank
dividend that he will have when he is forced to exit the banking sector:
Vt = Et
[ ∞∑
τ=t+1
(1− σ)στ−t−1Λt,τnτ
]
. (1.22)
A moral hazard problem is embedded between shareholders (households) and bankers
as in Gertler and Karadi (2011). After the banker has obtained funds from households,
he can transfer a fraction of the bank assets back to his family. The fraction of diversion
from bank assets (Θt) is assumed to depend on the current composition of the bank’s
borrowing, xt:
Θ(xt) = θ
(
1 + εxt +
κ
2
x2t
)
, (1.23)
7We use lower case letters for individual variables (xt,dt,st,et,nt) and capital letters for aggregate
variables (Xt,Dt,St,Et,Nt).
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where θ > 0, ε < 0, and κ > 0.8 If the banker diverts a fraction of the bank assets, the
bank defaults. Being aware of the banker’s behavior, households restrict the amount of
their lending to ensure that the banker’s payoff from diverting funds does not exceed
his value of staying in the banking sector. Therefore, the banker will not choose to
divert funds in equilibrium, but he faces a borrowing constraint:
Vt ≥ Θ(xt)Qtst. (1.24)
The detailed derivation of the banker’s optimal decision in the absence of policy is
shown in Appendix 1.5.3. The problem in the presence of macroprudential policy can
be solved analogously. Under the macroprudential policy of (1.17), the closed form of
Vt is
Vt(st, xt, nt) =
[(
µs,t − τ kt νt
)
+ (µe,t + τ
e
t νt)xt
]
Qtst + νtnt, (1.25)
where the Lagrange multipliers (LMs) in (1.25) are recursively defined as
νt ≡ Et (Λt,t+1Ωt+1)Rt+1, (1.26)
µs,t ≡ Et [Λt,t+1Ωt+1 (Rk,t+1 −Rt+1)] , (1.27)
µe,t ≡ Et [Λt,t+1Ωt+1 (Rt+1 −Re,t+1)] , (1.28)
Ωt+1 ≡ (1− σ) + σ [φt+1 (µs,t+1 + xt+1µe,t+1) + νt+1] . (1.29)
Above, Ωt+1 is the shadow price of the net worth tomorrow, νt is the bank’s private
cost of issuing deposits (or, the private value of a unit of bank net worth), and µe,t is
the private cost of issuing deposits in excess of outside equity. In the steady state µe,t is
positive. This is because bank outside equity can help banks hedge against the financial
8The parameter values of ε and κ in GKQ and in this paper are such that the marginal fraction
of diversion Θ′(xt) is positive. The intuition is that at the margin, it is more difficult to divert the
bank assets funded by short-term debt than those funded by outside equity. Since the bank equity
is contingent liability, it is more difficult to monitor by outside equity holders. This idea comes from
Calomiris and Kahn (1991).
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shock and consequently, the cost of outside equity is lower than that of deposits from
the perspective of the bank. The expression µs,t + xtµe,t is the net profit of bank assets
with the balance sheet structure xt. As the borrowing constraint (1.24) is binding, by
(1.20) and (1.25), the optimal bank leverage ratio is
φt =
νt
Θ(xt)− (µs,t + xtµe,t) . (1.30)
The macroprudential policy rule in GKQ chooses the bank equity subsidy depending
on the shadow cost of the bank deposit, νt:
τ et =
τ1
νt
, (1.31)
where τ1 is a policy parameter. In our alternative rule, called capital ratio rule, the
central bank chooses the bank equity subsidy based on the aggregate bank outside
equity ratio, Xt:
9
τ et = τ0Xt + Aτ0, (1.32)
where Aτ0 is the level parameter and τ0 is the slope parameter, and they can be negative.
When τ0 is positive, the central bank offers a progressive subsidy.
If we consider the evolution of aggregate net worth in the banking sector, the dy-
namics of new bankers and old bankers needs to be taken into account. It is assumed
that the initial wealth of new bankers Ny,t is a fixed fraction ξ of the bank assets at the
end of the period t,
Nt = σ (Rk,tQt−1St−1 −RtDt−1 −Re,tqt−1Et−1) +Ny,t, (1.33)
Ny,t = ξRk,tQt−1St−1.
9The idea is from a number of studies in the literature such as Perotti and Suarez (2009) and
Hanson et al. (2011). They suggest that macroprudential policy should focus on regulations of bank
capital and capital requirements. Here, Xt is the aggregate level of the outside equity ratio so that
one individual bank cannot affect the subsidy level τet . In equilibrium, all individual banks choose the
same level of xt.
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Following GKQ, welfare is measured by the household’s lifetime utility (1.4) at the
steady state (i.e., conditional on being in the pre-crisis economy). We compare welfare
under different policy rules using consumption equivalent. More details of the welfare
description are shown in Appendix 1.5.6.
1.2.6 Frictions in the Model
In the GKQ model, the source of financial frictions is the moral hazard problem. One
outcome of the moral hazard problem is that the total bank assets that banks can
fund are limited by the borrowing constraint. Banks do not have sufficient net worth,
so they have to borrow from households. Due to the banker’s ability to divert funds,
households restrict the amount of funds they provide to the banker. Therefore, with a
given amount of net worth, there is a limit to the assets that the bank can fund.
Given the limit on bank borrowing, there is a trade-off between issuing bank outside
equity and issuing deposits. On one hand, from the perspective of the bank, the private
cost of issuing deposits is higher than that of outside equity because bank outside
equity can help banks hedge against the financial risk. On the other hand, a higher
ratio of outside equity on the balance sheet incentivizes the banker to divert more funds,
tightening the borrowing constraint. As a result, the bank’s optimal choice is a mixture
of outside equity and deposits.
In the following analysis, we describe how the macroprudential policy (1.17)-(1.18)
alters the outside equity ratio, and thereby affects the moral hazard problem. These
qualitative features are common to the GKQ policy rule and the capital ratio rule. We
start with the direct effect of the policy on the bank’s balance sheet.
Effect 1 A higher level of outside equity subsidy τ et raises the outside equity ratio xt in
the steady state and tightens the borrowing constraint.
From the perspective of the bank, a higher level of outside equity subsidy τ et gives extra
revenue from issuing bank outside equity, so it increases the outside equity ratio xt in
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the steady state. A higher outside equity ratio raises the banker’s fraction of diversion,
and according to (1.30), it makes the borrowing constraint tighter. We call this negative
effect of the policy on the bank’s borrowing constraint moral hazard effect.
On the other hand, the macroprudential policy has a general equilibrium effect on
the security prices and thereby indirectly affects the borrowing constraint.
Effect 2 A higher level of subsidy reduces the bank’s extra cost of deposits in excess
of outside equity µe and raises the net profit of bank assets µs, both of which make the
moral hazard cost less severe and relax the bank’s borrowing constraint.
The macroprudential policy changes the bank’s private cost/value of outside equity and
net worth in equilibrium. We call this positive, general equilibrium effect of the policy
cost reduction effect. The details of this effect are the following.
As the central bank raises the outside equity subsidy, banks supply more outside
equity and less deposits, so the expected return on outside equity Re,t+1 goes up and
the return on deposits Rt+1 goes down. From Eq. (1.28), it lowers µe,t in the steady
state; and from Eq. (1.27), a lower Rt+1 raises the profit per unit of bank asset, and
hence µs,t increases in the steady state. Quantitatively, the overall effect of the subsidy
on the net profit of bank asset µs,t + xtµe,t turns out to be positive.
10 From Eq. (1.29),
a higher net profit of bank asset has an amplification effect on the shadow price of the
net worth Ωt because µs,t + xtµe,t is leveraged by φt. As a result, a higher bank equity
subsidy τ et induces a higher level of Ωt in the steady state. The higher level of Ωt means
that banks value the future net worth more, and from (1.26)-(1.28), it has a reinforcing
effect on LMs in the steady state: νt is increased, µs,t is further increased, and the
initial drop of µe,t is partially cancelled.
In summary, there are two channels through which the outside equity subsidy affects
the leverage ratio: Effect 1 shows that a higher level of subsidy raises the outside
10In the steady state, the return on the firm equity Rk is higher than both the costs of issuing
deposits Re and bank equity R, so the credit spread Rk −R is larger than the cost difference Re −R.
Moreover, the outside equity ratio x is smaller than 1. From (1.27)-(1.28), µs is much larger than xµe
in the steady state.
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equity ratio and tightens the borrowing constraint, while Effect 2 demonstrates that
the subsidy relaxes the borrowing constraint by changing security prices. When the cost
reduction effect on the bank leverage ratio dominates the moral hazard effect, banks
benefit more from the hedging effect of outside equity. In that sense, the financial
friction in the banking sector is reduced and therefore, banks can raise more assets in
equilibrium. From this aspect, the central bank can choose a subsidy level that achieves
the highest bank assets in the pre-shock economy.
1.3 Simulation Results
In this section, we compare the simulation results of different macroprudential policy
rules to show how they mitigate the negative impact of the financial shock and improve
welfare. Section 1.3.1 shows the simulation results. Section 1.3.2 provides the impulse
responses of variables after the financial shock and explains why the capital ratio rule
has a better stabilization effect on the bank assets and production than the GKQ rule.
Finally, Section 1.3.3 investigates how the better stabilization effect further results in
a higher steady state level of bank assets and consumption.
Following GKQ, we conduct the first-order approximation around the ‘risk-adjusted
steady state’ (i.e., the ‘risky steady state’ in Coeurdacier, Rey and Winant (2011))
instead of around the deterministic steady state, so that agents’ perceptions of the
possible future risk have an impact on the steady state values. The risky steady state
refers to “the point where agents choose to stay at a given date if they expect future
risk and if the realization of shocks is 0 at this date” [Coeurdacier et al. (2011)], and
in this paper, it represents the pre-crisis economy or the economy in normal times.
Henceforth, we refer to the risky steady state simply as steady state. To compute the
risky steady state, we use the iteration method that follows Coeurdacier et al. (2011)
and GKQ, which we explain in detail in Appendix 1.5.5. Also, the welfare computation
is described in Appendix 1.5.6.
There are 16 parameters in the baseline model. The parameter values are from
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GKQ and they are summarized in Table 1.1.
Table 1.1: Parameters
β 0.99 discount factor
γ 2 relative risk aversion
h 0.75 habit formation coefficient
χ 0.25 weight coefficient of labor
ϕ 0.33 inverse Frisch elasticity of labor supply
α 0.33 share of capital
δ 0.0025 physical capital depreciation rate
Ψ 1 elasticity of the price of capital to investment
σ 0.9685 probability of bank survival
ξ 0.00289 households transfer ratio to new banks
θ 0.264 moral hazard parameter
ε −1.21 bank’s diversion parameter (linear term)
κ 13.41 bank’s diversion parameter (quadratic term)
E(ψt) 1 mean of the financial shock
std(ψt) 0.69% standard deviation of the financial shock
1.3.1 The Risky Steady State
The risky steady state values of key variables are shown in Table 1.2. For each policy
scenario, the results are under the optimal policy parameter(s). The first column is
levels and the second column is standard deviations.
Table 1.2 shows that in comparison with the no-policy regime, the GKQ rule achieves
0.53 percent consumption equivalent. But the capital ratio rule improves welfare to a
higher level of 1.62 percent consumption equivalent. That is, under the capital ratio
rule, the financial frictions in the model are more mitigated. The results also show that
the frictionless economy has the consumption equivalent of 4.8 percent and hence, the
capital ratio rule recovers about one third of the welfare loss.11
Figure 1.1 shows the welfare surface under the capital ratio rule. In Figure 1.1, the
Y-axis is the steady state level of τ e instead of τ0 for the exposition purpose.
12 The
11We can derive the equilibrium of a frictionless economy by solving the social planner’s problem,
choosing (Yt, Lt, Ct, It, St) to maximize the household’s utility subject to the resource constraints
(3.30)-(1.3) and (1.11).
12There is a one-to-one mapping between the steady state level of τe and τ0 > 0 for a given value of
Aτ0 because Xt increases with τ0.
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Table 1.2: The Risk Steady States and Standard Deviations13
No policy GKQ rule Capital ratio rule
Steady state Std. Dev. Steady state Std. Dev. Steady state Std. Dev.
Output Y 23.58 0.9526 24.17 0.9573 24.37 0.9334
Consumption C 18.42 0.7165 18.82 0.7147 18.95 0.6974
Labor L 8.10 0.2414 8.25 0.2390 8.30 0.2266
Capital K 206.29 12.7281 214.25 12.9550 216.91 12.4599
Net worth N 32.48 4.9305 31.84 6.1674 31.33 7.4127
Risk-free return R(%) 1.02 0.0017 0.985 0.0021 0.974 0.0022
Risky return Rk(%) 1.27 0.0141 1.227 0.0108 1.211 0.0102
Credit spread Rk−R(%) 0.25 0.0155 0.24 0.0125 0.237 0.0119
Outside equity ratio x 0.1036 0.0372 0.1619 0.0489 0.1556 0.1130
Leverage ratio φ 6.4876 0.7195 6.7123 0.9813 6.9094 1.2748
Deposit cost ν 1.6051 0.1284 1.7152 0.1552 1.7546 0.1377
Excess equity cost µe 0.047 0.0018 0.030 0.0042 0.017 0.0054
Bank asset profit µs 0.2447 0.6862 0.3109 0.1981 0.3187 0.0827
Overall profit µs + xµe 0.2496 0.6843 0.3157 0.1960 0.3213 0.0799
Subsidy τe 0 N/A 0.0016 1.45× 10−4 0.00155 2.36× 10−4
Tax τk 0 N/A 2.6× 10−4 1.02× 10−4 2.4× 10−4 5.39× 10−4
Consumption equivalent Γ(%) 0 N/A 0.5264 N/A 1.6184 N/A
Financial shock ψ 1 0.69% 1 0.69% 1 0.69%
red line on the surface shows the optimal welfare point for each value of Aτ0, and the
optimal point is found at (τ ∗0 , A
∗
τ0) = (0.0209,−0.0017). Whereas the optimum is found
on the boundary of the set of parameter values that guarantee the Blanchard-Kahn
condition, the capital ratio rule performs better than the GKQ rule for a wide range of
parameter values: τ0 ∈ (0.0045, 0.0209) and Aτ0 ∈ (−0.0017, 0).
The results in Table 1.2 show that the GKQ rule and our rule are similar regarding
the optimal level of bank equity subsidy τ e (0.0016 and 0.00155, respectively) and the
outside equity ratio x (16.19% and 15.56%, respectively) in the steady state. However,
under the capital ratio rule, the bank’s private value of net worth (νt) and the leverage
ratio are higher than under the GKQ rule, which gives rise to higher bank assets,
output, and consumption. Also, under the capital ratio rule, the standard deviations
of the real sector variables are lower than under the GKQ rule. In the next section,
we demonstrate that the capital ratio rule has a better stabilization effect on bank
assets and production in the economy after a financial shock. Then in Section 1.3.3,
we explain how the better stabilization effect under our rule, in turn, leads to a higher
level of bank assets, output, and consumption in the pre-shock economy.
13The results are robust to the choice of parameters, and more details are shown in Appendix 1.5.4.
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Figure 1.1: Welfare under the Capital Ratio Rule
-1.8
W
: W
el
fa
re
-1.6
×10-3
A
τ0
-1.4 0.511.5
×10-3
τ
e: Bank Equity Subsidy
2-1.2 2.533.5
-1 4
Note: The optimal point is when (τ∗0 , A
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τ0) = (0.0209,−0.0017), and it corresponds to τe = 0.00155.
1.3.2 The Policy Response to Shock
In this section, we conduct an impulse response analysis and demonstrate that under
the capital ratio rule, the equity subsidy reacts more strongly to shocks with the result
that the economy has less fluctuations than that under the GKQ rule. Figure 1.2 shows
the impulse responses of relevant variables under different rules. The shock is a decrease
of ψt by one standard deviation. All variables are in log deviations from the steady
state except the credit spread, which is presented as the actual deviation.
The response in the no-policy regime is provided as a benchmark. In the no-policy
regime, when the shock occurs, the total bank assets deteriorate and banks suffer loss,
so the net worth Nt goes down. Since the decrease in the net worth makes the bank
borrowing constraint tighter, banks choose to lower the moral hazard cost Θt by reduc-
ing the outside equity ratio xt. Consequently, bank outside equity et drops by 15% and
bank deposits Dt goes up by 5%. The drop of capital Kt leads to an increase in the
marginal product of capital and hence, the return on the bank asset Rk,t goes up. The
impact of the shock on Rk,t is larger than that on the risk-free return Rt, so the credit
spread Rk,t−Rt increases. The increase in the credit spread raises the net profit of the
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Figure 1.2: Baseline Model, GKQ Policy and Capital Ratio Policy
bank asset µs,t + xtµe,t. From Eq. (1.30), lower Θt and higher µs,t + xtµe,t result in an
increase in the leverage ratio φt.
The positive response of φt implies that banks can obtain more assets for each unit
of net worth, and a higher µs,t + xtµe,t indicates that each unit of net worth yields a
higher profit. From Eq. (1.29), the higher net profit µs,t+xtµe,t is leveraged by φt, which
leads to a positive response of the shadow price of the net worth Ωt+1. From (1.26)-
(1.28), a higher Ωt+1 raises the LMs νt, µs,t and µe,t in the following period, which
helps to maintain the positive response of the leverage ratio. In this way, although
the net worth decreases, banks lowering the outside equity ratio helps banks mitigate
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the negative impact of the financial shock through the long-lasting positive effects on
the leverage ratio. This is the self-recovering procedure of the banking sector after a
financial shock that is present even when no policy is conducted.
Before looking at the impulse responses under time-varying macroprudential poli-
cies, we briefly analyze the effect of constant subsidy rule in which the subsidy rate is
constant over time (i.e. τ et = τ).
14 From Effect 1, the subsidy raises the outside equity
ratio xt in the steady state. Because of the hedging effect of outside equity, a high level
of xt helps to absorb part of the bank’s loss caused by the financial shock. Therefore, a
higher level of outside equity subsidy has a better hedging effect beforehand. After the
shock occurs, however, the subsidy hinders the self-recovering procedure of the banking
sector through the leverage ratio. While the shock induces the outside equity ratio to
decrease, a high level of subsidy maintains the outside equity ratio at a high level. It
raises the moral hazard cost, lowers the leverage ratio and thereby, partially impedes
the deposit issuance after the shock. Overall, if the central bank chooses an optimal
level of subsidy (τ et = τ = 0.0016, ∀t), the pre-shock hedging effect dominates the
post-shock impeding effect, so the welfare is improved.
Now we look at impulse responses under the GKQ rule. The pre-shock hedging effect
of the subsidy is nearly the same as that under the constant subsidy rule because the
steady state level of subsidy is very close. However, as the subsidy responds negatively
to νt under the GKQ rule, the central bank reduces the subsidy by 2% and keeps it
low for a long period of time, which causes a 10% decrease in the outside equity ratio
xt. Compared to the constant subsidy rule, the GKQ rule reduces the subsidy after the
shock and therefore, the bank’s self-recovery procedure is less hindered. As a result, the
GKQ rule leads to a longer-lasting increase in the leverage ratio, and thereby a better
stabilization effect on the bank assets than the constant subsidy rule.
Compared to the GKQ rule, the capital ratio rule has an even larger stabilization
effect on the economy. The analysis of the bank’s self-curing mechanism under the
14The impulse responses under the constant subsidy rule are not shown in Figure 1.2 because it
would congest the figure. They are shown in Figure 1.4 in Appendix 1.5.7.
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no-policy regime suggests that reducing the subsidy after the shock helps to reduce the
moral hazard cost, raises the leverage ratio φt and makes the positive response of φt last
for a longer period of time. Being different from the GKQ rule, the capital ratio rule
decreases the subsidy by 50% after the shock and keeps it around 20% below the steady
state, achieving a lower outside equity ratio. In other words, under the capital ratio
rule, the self-recovering procedure through leverage is even less hindered than under the
GKQ rule. As a result, it has a better performance in mitigating the consumption and
output drop, which is consistent with the smaller second moments of variables (e.g., Kt
and Ct) in Table 1.2.
In the context of the capital requirement for bank, the GKQ rule and the capital
ratio rule require a similar level in normal times but the latter is more ‘countercyclical’:
it lowers the capital requirement to a larger extent once the shock occurs (see Figure
1.2). A high capital ratio before the shock helps the bank hedge the financial risk, but a
lower capital ratio after the shock can reduce the decrease in total bank assets. Our rule
is consistent with the literature on a time-varying capital requirements, e.g., Kashyap
and Stein (2004) and Hanson et al. (2011). Moreover, the capital ratio rule is in line
with the macroprudential capital policy tool of the Bank of England in Harimohan and
Nelson (2012).
The above analysis implies that if a macroprudential policy rule encourages bank
leverage after a shock, it can better stabilize the economy. In this context, while
the GKQ rule has “the flavor of a countercyclical capital requirement” (GKQ, page
S31), it is quantitatively not so countercyclical. The point is that while the GKQ
model is rich enough to decompose the permanent, “prudential” component of a policy
(i.e., discouraging banks from too much leverage on average) and the “countercyclical”
component of a policy (i.e., encouraging banks to invest in assets in bad times), they
do not fully distinguish these two components when proposing their policy rule. The
capital ratio rule we propose is the most parsimonious policy rule that can affect both
the prudential and the countercyclical component separately with an easily-observed
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target.
Besides, there is one advantage of choosing the outside equity ratio as a policy target
that the response of xt to shocks is more persistent, achieving a more countercyclical
capital requirement. This is because xt is very sensitive to the response of the subsidy
to shocks. When the shock occurs, xt goes down and under the capital ratio rule, a
lower level of xt reduces the subsidy τ
e
t , which in turn maintains xt at a lower level. It
results in a much more persistent response of xt to shocks. In contrast, the response of
νt to shocks is relatively small when the central bank applies different rules. For this
reason, the policy rule in which the subsidy responds to the outside equity ratio xt with
only one parameter, that is, Aτ0 = 0 in (1.32), still outperforms the GKQ rule.
For these reasons, if we modify the shadow value-targeting policy rule of GKQ as
τ et = τA + τBνt + τCµe,t,
15 (1.34)
it would perform better partially because it allows separating the prudential part and
the countercyclical part and because µe,t is a target that is persistent though not easily
observed. In the next section, we demonstrate that the better stabilization of the post-
shock economy, in turn, leads to higher investment in the pre-shock economy and that
it is mainly because the policy reduces the bank’s financing cost.
1.3.3 The Second-moment Effect of Different Rules
On one hand, the better stabilization of the capital ratio rule in the post-shock economy
explained in Section 1.3.2 positively contributes to the welfare of the risk-averse house-
hold. On the other hand, Table 1.2 shows that while the level of the equity subsidy
is similar across different rule, the level of bank leverage, physical capital and output
in the steady state is higher under the capital ratio rule, which also contributes to the
higher welfare. In this section, we attempt to detect the mechanism through which the
15This policy rule is optimized when the parameter values are τA = 0.22, τB = −0.128 and τC =
−16.6. I acknowledge the referee for suggesting this policy rule.
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better stabilization under the capital ratio rule results in a higher level of bank assets,
and therefore higher output and consumption in the pre-shock economy.
For this purpose, we will show the results for the GKQ rule, the capital ratio rule,
and the constant subsidy rule. We add the constant subsidy rule for comparison because
under such a policy rule, we can exclude the second-moment effect of the subsidy’s
response to shocks on the steady state values. For better comparison, we fix the steady
state level of bank equity subsidy across different rules.
We do experiments at various levels of subsidy, and find the result that is common
across the policy rules: as we increase the steady state level of the bank equity subsidy
τ et , the welfare W first goes up and then goes down at some point. We find that the
highest welfare corresponds to the lowest level of return on physical capital Rk at the
steady state. Intuitively, according to the diminishing marginal productivity of capital
in the production function, the lowest level of return on capital corresponds to the
highest level of capital stock in the steady state, which leads to the highest output
and consumption level. So we use Rk as the proxy to see the effect of the policy on
welfare. By solving Eqs. (1.26)-(1.30) in the risky steady state system, we can obtain
the following proposition that tells us how the return on capital is affected by a policy.
Proposition 1 In the macroprudential policy framework (1.17), the steady state level
of the return on bank assets (Rk,t) can be expressed as a function of bank outside equity
ratio (xt), subsidy (τ
e
t ) and the second moments of variables in the steady state, namely,
Rk =
Mµe + τ
eMν
Mµs
Θ(x)
Θ′(x)︸ ︷︷ ︸
S1
+
ν − µex
ν + µs︸ ︷︷ ︸
S2
. (1.35)
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Here, Mµe, Mν and Mµs are second moments of µe, ν and µs, respectively, and they are
Mν = 1 + cov(Ω̂, Λ̂), (1.36)
Mµe = −Λ
[
(Re −R) + (Re −R)cov(Λ̂, Ω̂) +Recov(Λ̂, R̂e) +Recov(Ω̂, R̂e)
]
, (1.37)
Mµs = Λ
(
1 + cov(Λ̂, Ω̂) + cov(Λ̂, R̂k) + cov(Ω̂, R̂k)
)
, (1.38)
where cov(·) is the unconditional covariance and ‘∧’ is the log-deviation from the steady
state.
From Eq. (1.35), we can see that the total effect of the policy can be split into the moral
hazard effect and the cost reduction effect, which we discussed in Section 1.2.6. The
first term S1 is the moral hazard effect on welfare:
Θ(x)
Θ′(x) is the inverse of the marginal
contribution ratio of the outside equity ratio x on the moral hazard cost, and it increases
with the equity subsidy τ e. As the outside equity ratio x increases with τ e, the bank’s
borrowing constraint becomes tighter and hence, the moral hazard effect is higher.
The second term S2 is the cost reduction effect: it reveals the general equilibrium
effect on the private cost/value of outside equity, deposits, and net worth. Recalling
(1.26)-(1.28), µe is the private cost of the deposit in excess of the outside equity and
ν+µs is the return on the bank asset. When the central bank raises the subsidy level, a
higher outside equity ratio x reduces the bank’s cost of raising one unit of asset because
µe is positive in equilibrium. In addition, the general equilibrium effect raises the profit
of the net worth µs and therefore, S2 decreases. That is to say, each unit of net worth
yields more profit. As a result, the cost reduction effect on welfare is increasing when
the subsidy τ e increases.
Figure 1.3 decomposes the total effect on Rk into the moral hazard effect (S1) and
the cost reduction effect (S2) at various steady state levels of subsidy, low S1 + S2
corresponding to low Rk and hence high welfare. In general, as the subsidy increases,
the moral hazard effect goes up and the cost reduction effect goes down. Figure 1.3
shows that while the properties of the moral hazard effect under different policy rules
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Figure 1.3: Moral Hazard Effect S1 v.s. Cost Reduction Effect S2
are nearly the same, the cost reduction effect is significantly lower under the capital
ratio rule at any steady state level of subsidy. This is due to the better stabilization of
the capital ratio rule. As we discussed in Section 1.3.2, the subsidy reacts more strongly
to the financial shock under the capital ratio rule, generating more countercyclical and
more persistent Ωt. In (1.38), because both Rk,t and Λt,t+1 are countercyclical, the
higher countercyclicality of Ωt raises the covariance terms in Mµs, and it results in a
higher µs in the risky steady state. As a result, by controlling the level of τ
e, the steady
state value of µs is higher under the capital ratio rule. It leads to a better cost reduction
effect and therefore, a higher steady state level of bank assets.
1.4 Concluding Remark
This paper proposes a welfare-improving macroprudential policy rule in the framework
of Gertler, Kiyotaki and Queralto (2012). Our rule chooses the bank equity subsidy
rate that responds to the aggregate bank outside equity ratio.
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We find that the policy rule proposed in GKQ overlooks the importance of reducing
the moral hazard cost after the financial shock. By lowering the bank equity subsidy
level after a shock, the moral hazard cost is reduced and banks rely more on the deposit
issuance. As a result, bank borrowing is maintained at a higher level, and the bank asset
deterioration is more mitigated, achieving a better stabilization effect on asset prices
and production. The results show that our rule achieves quantitatively more significant
countercyclical capital requirement, which is in line with the macroprudential policy
literature.
Our study also sheds light on the mechanism through which the macroprudential
policy affects the bank balance sheet through security prices. We find that the response
of the subsidy to shocks has a significant, positive impact on the pre-crisis bank asset
value. Besides the stabilization effect of the policy itself, this is another important
channel through which the policy affects welfare.
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1.5 Technical Appendix
1.5.1 The System of Equations under the Alternative Policy
Yt = (ψtSt−1)αL1−αt , (1.39)
Yt = Ct +
[
1 + f
(
It
It−1
)]
It, (1.40)
St = ψt [(1− δ)St−1 + It−1] , (1.41)
Rt+1Et (Λt,t+1) = 1, (1.42)
Et (Λt,t+1Re,t+1) = 1, (1.43)
jt =
Jt
Jt−1
, (1.44)
Jt = Ct − hCt−1 − χ
1 + ϕ
L1+ϕt , (1.45)
(1− α) [1− βhEt (j−γt+1)]Yt = χL1+ϕt , (1.46)
EtΛt,t+1 = β
Et
(
j−γt+1
)− βhEt (j−γt+1j−γt+2)
1− βhEt
(
j−γt+1
) , (1.47)
Re,t =
[
α
(
Lt
ψtSt−1
)1−α
+ (1− δ)qt
]
ψt
qt−1
, (1.48)
Rk,t =
[
α
(
Lt
ψtSt−1
)1−α
+ (1− δ)Qt
]
ψt
Qt−1
, (1.49)
Qt = 1 + f(
It
It−1
) +
It
It−1
f ′(
It
It−1
)− Et
[
Λt,t+1
(
It+1
It
)2
f ′(
It+1
It
)
]
, (1.50)
Nt = σ [(Rk,t − xt−1Re,t −Rt + xt−1Rt)Qt−1St−1 +RtNt−1] + (1− σ)ξRk,tQt−1St−1,
(1.51)
Θt = θ
(
1 + εxt +
κ
2
x2t
)
, (1.52)
Ntφt = QtKt, (1.53)
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φt =
νt
Θt − (µst + xtµet) , (1.54)
νt = Et(Λt,t+1Ωt+1)Rt+1, (1.55)
µs,t = Et [Λt+1Ωt+1 (Rk,t+1 −Rt+1)] , (1.56)
µe,t = Et [Λt+1Ωt+1 (Rt+1 −Re,t+1)] , (1.57)
Ωt = (1− σ) + σ [(µs,t + xtµe,t)φt + νt] , (1.58)
θ (µs,t + µe,txt) (ε+ κxt) = θ
(
1 + εxt +
κ
2
x2t
)
[µe,t + νt (τ0xt + Aτ0)] , (1.59)
(
1 + τ kt
)
QtSt = Nt + (1 + τ
e
t ) qtet +Dt, (1.60)
xt =
qtet
QtSt
, (1.61)
τ et = τ0Xt + Aτ0, (1.62)
τ kt = Xtτ
e
t . (1.63)
Xt = xt. (1.64)
1.5.2 The Optimization Problem of Households
Rewrite the budget constraint (1.5) as
Ξt ≡ Ct +Dh,t + qtet −WtLt − Πt −RtDh,t−1 − [Zt + (1− δ)qt]ψtet−1 ≤ 0. (1.65)
The Lagrangian for the household problem is then
L1 = Et
∞∑
τ=t
βτ−t
{
1
1− γ
(
Cτ − hCτ−1 − χ
1 + ϕ
L1+ϕτ
)1−γ
− λτΞτ
}
. (1.66)
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The representative household chooses the variables (Ct, Lt, Dh,t, et) to maximize (1.4).
The first order conditions are
∂L
∂Ct
=
(
Ct − hCt−1 − χ
1 + ϕ
L1+ϕt
)−γ
− λt − βhEt
(
Ct+1 − hCt − χ
1 + ϕ
L1+ϕt+1
)−γ
= 0,
(1.67)
∂L
∂Lt
= −χ
(
Ct − hCt−1 − χ
1 + ϕ
L1+ϕt
)−γ
Lϕt + λtWt = 0, (1.68)
∂L
∂Dh,t
= Et (−λt + βRt+1λt+1) = 0, (1.69)
∂L
∂et
= −λtqt + βEt [λt+1 (Zt+1 + (1− δ)qt+1ψt+1)] = 0. (1.70)
From the above equations, we can derive (1.8)-(1.10) and (1.15) in Section 1.2.2.
1.5.3 The Optimization Problem of Banks
We use Bellman equations to solve the banker’s optimization problem because the value
function appears in the moral hazard constraint. Here we demonstrate two different
ways to derive the specific form of the value function.
(1) Guess and Verify Method
This method is used in GKQ and Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010). First, we simplify the
net worth accumulation function by Eqs. (1.17) and (1.19)
nt = [Rk,t −Rt(1− xt−1)−Re,txt−1]Qt−1st−1 +Rtnt−1. (1.71)
Here xt, st are the control variables and nt is the state variable. The Bellman equation
is
Vt−1(st−1, xt−1, nt−1) = Et−1Λt−1,t
{
(1− σ)nt + σmax
st,xt
[Vt(st, xt, nt)]
}
. (1.72)
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The guess solution is
Vt(st, xt, nt) = (µs,t + xtµe,t)Qtst + vtnt. (1.73)
We need to verify that the solution satisfies the expression (1.72) for all t.
The bank maximizes the objective function subject to the moral hazard constraint,
so the Lagrangian is constructed as
L2 = (1 + λt)[(µs,t + xtµe,t)Qtst + vtnt]− λtθ
(
1 + εxt +
κ
2
x2t
)
Qtst.
The first order conditions with respect to xt and st are
(1 + λt) =
λtθ (ε+ κxt)
µe,t
. (1.74)
(1 + λt)(µs,t + xtµe,t) = λtθ
(
1 + εxt +
κ
2
x2t
)
. (1.75)
Assuming that the moral hazard constraint is binding, we have
Vt(st, xt, nt) = (µs,t + xtµe,t)Qtst + vtnt = θ
(
1 + εxt +
κ
2
x2t
)
Qtst.
Substituting (1.74) into (1.75), we derive banks’ optimal outside equity ratio xt,
(ε+ κxt) (
µs,t
µe,t
+ xt) = 1 + εxt +
κ
2
x2t .
Substituting (1.73) into the Bellman Equation (1.72),
(µs,t + xtµe,t)Qtst + vtnt = EtΛt,t+1 {(1− σ) + σ [(µs,t+1 + xt+1µe,t+1)φt+1 + vt+1]}nt+1.
(1.76)
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Denoting Ωt+1 = (1− σ) + σ [(µs,t+1 + xt+1µe,t+1)φt+1 + vt+1], it becomes
(µs,t+xtµe,t)Qtst+vtnt = EtΛt,t+1Ωt+1 ([Rk,t+1 −Rt+1(1− xt)−Re,t+1xt]Qtst +Rt+1nt) .
(1.77)
So if we change notations as Eqs. (1.26)-(1.29) in Section 1.2.5, both sides of the
expression (1.77) are identical for all t.
LHS = EtΛt,t+1Ωt+1 ([Rk,t+1 − (1− xt)Rt+1 − xtRe,t+1]Qtst +Rt+1nt)
= RHS.
So the Bellman equation is satisfied for any t with the Value function (1.73). This
method requires the correct guess of the functional form.
(2) Derivation Method without Guessing the Functional Form
The bank’s objective function is (1.22), and the net worth accumulation function (1.21)
can be rearranged as
g(nt+1, nt, xt, st) = Γtnt − nt+1 = 0,
where
Γt = [Rk,t+1 −Rt+1(1− xt)−Re,t+1xt]φt +Rt+1.
So the Lagrangian can be written as
L3 = Et
∞∑
τ=t+1
στ−t−1Λt,τ {(1− σ)nτ + Ωτg(nτ , nτ−1, xτ−1, sτ−1)} .
The first order condition with respect to nt+1 is
Ωt+1 = (1− σ) + σΛt+1,t+2Ωt+2Rt+2 . . .
+ σφt+1 [Λt+1,t+2Ωt+2 (Rk,t+2 −Rt+2) + xt+1Λt+1,t+2Ωt+2 (Rt+2 −Re,t+2)] .
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If we use the same notations as Eqs. (1.26)-(1.28), we have
Ωt+1 = (1− σ) + σ [νt+1 + φt+1 (µs,t+1 + xt+1µe,t+1)] . (1.78)
Letting ∆t+1 denote the price of the net worth at time t+1. Since the objective function
(1.22) is linear with respect to the net worth, the bank’s value function Vt should be
equal to the discounted value of the net worth tomorrow,
Vt(nt) = EtΛt,t+1∆t+1nt+1. (1.79)
We substitute it into the Bellman Equation (1.72) to get the recursive form of ∆t+1,
EtΛt,t+1∆t+1nt+1 = Et ((1− σ)Λt,t+1nt+1 + σEtΛt,t+1 [Et+1Λt+1,t+2∆t+2nt+2])
= EtΛt,t+1nt+1 [(1− σ) + σ (Λt+1,t+2∆t+2Γt+1)] . (1.80)
The second equality comes from the Law of Iterated Expectation. Since the optimal
solution requires that the equality of Eq. (1.80) holds for any t, we can derive the
recursive form of ∆t+1 by comparing both sides of the equation,
∆t+1 = (1− σ) + σΛt+1,t+2∆t+2Γt+1. (1.81)
Now we show that Ωt+1 is the price of net worth at time t+ 1, that is,
Ωt+1 = ∆t+1.
Recall that the Lagrangian is
L3 = Et
[ ∞∑
τ=t+1
στ−t−1Λt,τ [(1− σ)nτ + Ωτ [nτ − Γτ−1nτ−1]]
]
.
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Differentiating L3 with respect to nt+1, we get
EtΛt,t+1Ωt+1 = EtΛt,t+1(1− σ) + σEtΛt,t+2Ωt+2Γt+1, (1.82)
which implies Ωt+1 = ∆t+1 by comparing (1.81) and (1.82).
To get the closed form of the value function Vt, we substitute (1.82) into (1.79)
Vt(nt) = EtΛt,t+1Ωt+1Rt+1nt + EtΛt,t+1Ωt+1 (Rk,t+1 −Rt+1)φtnt . . .
+ EtΛt,t+1Ωt+1xt (Rt+1 −Re,t+1)φtnt.
It is the same as the solution (1.73) derived by the previous method.
1.5.4 Robustness Testing
The result of this paper is robust to the choice of parameters in the real sector and
of the size of the financial shock (the standard deviation from 0.5% to 2%). We show
that it is also robust to the choice of parameters in the banking sector at reasonable
intervals. To be specific, the results hold when κ ranges from 5 to 20, ε from −4 to 0
and θ from 0.15 to 0.35. Details are shown in Table 1.3.
1.5.5 The Risky Steady State
The idea of the risky steady state is from the literature Campbell (1994), Lettau (2003),
and Coeurdacier et al. (2011), and de Groot (2013) formally defines the risky steady
state. Generally, a general equilibrium model can be described as n non-linear equations
with n variables (xt),
Et[g(xt+1)] = Et
[
g(y+t+1,yt,y
−
t−1)
]
= 0.
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Table 1.3: Robustness Testing
Baseline GKQ New Policy Baseline GKQ New Policy
Parameter (θ) (0.15 - 0.35) 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.35 0.35 0.35
Capital (K) 216.3214 223.6795 226.3843 201.3784 209.4274 211.7824
Outside Equity Ratio (x) 0.1115 0.1722 0.1761 0.101 0.1572 0.1472
Leverage Ratio (φ) 7.8755 7.9848 8.1703 5.9531 6.1835 6.3668
Consumption Equivalent (%) 0 1.15 2.6105 0 0.4891 1.0719
Parameter (ε) (−4 - 0) −4 −4 −4 0 0 0
Capital (K) 218.6573 226.337 228.0944 204.403 212.3429 214.3057
Outside Equity Ratio (x) 0.2406 0.2874 0.2767 0.0504 0.1124 0.1112
Leverage Ratio (φ) 8.3633 8.5311 8.7651 6.2545 6.4687 6.6232
Consumption Equivalent (%) 0 0.6413 1.065 0 0.5183 1.0858
Parameter (κ) (5 - 20) 5 5 5 20 20 20
Capital (K) 211.1076 218.5153 227.3022 205.7405 213.8385 215.9743
Outside Equity Ratio(x) 0.2747 0.3474 0.2826 0.08697 0.1432 0.1481
Leverage Ratio (φ) 7.1876 7.3605 8.6845 6.4188 6.6521 6.8011
Consumption Equivalent (%) 0 0.6714 1.0938 0 0.5204 1.4901
Parameter (Ψ) (0.5%- 2%) 0.5 0.5 0.5 2 2 2
Capital (K) 209.419 214.5677 216.6659 201.2497 215.0543 217.5416
Outside Equity Ratio (x) 0.0975 0.1499 0.1496 0.1163 0.1731 0.1586
Leverage Ratio (φ) 6.7684 7.0112 7.2102 6.0604 6.2331 6.3487
Consumption Equivalent (%) 0 0.1941 0.7666 0 1.7914 3.5159
where y+t+1 is a vector of n1 forward-looking variables, yt is a vector of n2 static variables,
y−t−1 is a vector of n3 predetermined variables (n = n1 +n2 +n3), and g is a vector of n
non-linear functions. For example, if there is one forward-looking variable y+t+1 in the
ith equation, we do the second-order approximation around its conditional expectation.
So the second-order Taylor expansion of the ith equation (i = 1, . . . , n) is
Φi(y
+
t+1,yt,y
−
t−1) = gi(Ety+t+1, y¯, y¯−)+5giEt(xt+1−x¯)+
1
2!
g′′i Et(y+t+1−Ety+t+1)2+o(·) ' 0,
(1.83)
where the variables with ‘bar’ are those in the steady state, 5gi(·) is the gradient, and
g′′i (·) is the second derivative at the point Ety+t+1. We can see that Et(y+t+1 − Ety+t+1)2
is the conditional variance of y+t+1 and according to the risky steady state, it is not
zero. In other words, the term Et(y+t+1−Ety+t+1)2 is the key difference between the risky
steady state and the deterministic steady state.
Following Coeurdacier et al. (2011) and GKQ, we use the iteration method to solve
the risky steady state, and it can be summarized as follows: (i) we solve the determinis-
tic steady state of the model, and evaluate the second moments of the forward-looking
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variables in a linearized system around the deterministic steady state; (ii) use the de-
rived second moments to update the steady state values in the system (1.83) with
second order terms; (iii) derive the linearized system around the updated steady state
and compute the second moments of this system, substitute the second moments into
(1.83) and solve for x¯ to update the steady state. We keep iterating and updating the
steady state values and the second moments until they satisfy the steady state system
simultaneously.
Besides, de Groot (2013) combines Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe’s (2004) simple way to
compute the second-order approximate system around the deterministic steady state.
In de Groot (2013), the second-order approximation system can be used to compute
the risky steady state with lower computational costs.
1.5.6 Welfare and Consumption Equivalent
Welfare Wt in the model is the steady state of the representative household’s lifetime
utility
Wt = Et
∞∑
τ=t
βτ−tU (Cτ , Cτ−1, Lτ ) . (1.84)
We take the second-order approximation of the utility function around the risky steady
state, so the volatilities of consumption and labor are included. If we write (1.84) in a
recursive form,
Wt = U (Ct, Ct−1, Lt) + βEtWt+1.
In the risky steady state, we have
W = U(C,C, L) + βM(C,L)
1− β ,
where M(C,L) is the second moments of C and L.
We use consumption equivalent to compare the welfare between different policy
rules. Denote Γ as the percentage increase of consumption needed for the baseline
model to reach the same level of welfare under macroprudential policies. DenoteWGKQ
1.5. TECHNICAL APPENDIX 47
as the welfare under the GKQ rule and ΓGKQ as the consumption equivalent, and we
have
WGKQ = U
(
(1 + ΓGKQ)CB, (1 + ΓGKQ)CB, LB
)
+ βM(CB, LB)
1− β , (1.85)
where CB and LB are the risky steady state of consumption and labor in the baseline
model.
1.5.7 Impulse Responses under the Constant Subsidy Rule
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Figure 1.4: Baseline Model, GKQ Policy and Constant Subsidy Policy
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Chapter 2
Stationarity of Econometric
Learning with Bounded Memory
and a Predicted State Variable
Abstract
In this paper, we consider a model where producers set their prices based on their
prediction of the aggregated price level and an exogenous variable, which can be a
demand or a cost-push shock. To form their expectations, they use OLS-type econo-
metric learning with bounded memory. We show that the aggregated price follows the
random coefficient autoregressive process and we prove that this process is covariance
stationary.
Keywords: Econometric Learning, Bounded Memory, Random Coefficient Autore-
gressive Process, Stationarity
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2.1 Introduction
Econometric Learning was designed to model the forecast of the future economic vari-
ables in forward looking models. In contrast to the Rational Expectations Theory,
which imposes a very strong assumption that the agents know the structure of the
model, Econometric Learning only assumes that agents behave as professional econo-
metricians. They collect the available data and use OLS regression to produce the
forecast. As more data becomes available, this econometric forecast often converges
to the rational expectations equilibria (Sargent, 1993). Although econometric learning
relaxes many assumptions of the rational expectations mechanism, we think that one
of them could still be too strong. In particular, it assumes that agents have access to
the entire history of the variables, and they use all of them to form the forecast. Not
only does that assumption require infinite memory, it also neglects the cost of data
collection and processing.
Several papers facilitate the assumption of infinite memory and consider the case
when the memory is bounded (for a survey, see Chevillon and Mavroeidis, 2014).
However, the majority of the results are proven for non-stochastic models (Evans and
Honkapohja, 2000). The only exception known to us is Honkapohja and Mitra (2003)
who investigate learning with bounded memory in a stochastic environment. However,
they consider a very special case of learning the intercept parameter, and their model
does not account for the possibility of using some exogenous independent variables
when the expectation is formed.
This paper picks up the research from Honkapohja and Mitra (2003) and explores
the dynamic properties of econometric learning with bounded memory in a stochastic
environment. We expand that paper by adding a stochastic exogenous variable which
can be used for econometric forecasts.
The introduction of stochastic independent variable makes the mathematical frame-
work more complex as compared to Honkapohja and Mitra (2003) where the model
evolves according to a simple autoregressive process (AR). In this paper, the model
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is more complex since the transition matrix has random coefficients (the random coef-
ficient autoregressive model, RCAR, as in Nicholls and Quinn, 1982). It is also more
complex than Conlisk (1974), since our transition matrices are autocorrelated. Never-
theless, we proved the stationarity of the model. In addition, we formulate a sufficient
condition for stationarity which can be more generally applied in the RCAR literature.
This paper is structured as follows. In Section 2.2 we present the model and intro-
duce OLS-type learning with finite memory. In Section 2.3 we prove that the RCAR
process of price movement is covariance-stationary. Section 2.4 concludes the paper.
2.2 The model
We consider a model where producer j sets the current price pt(j) depending on the
expected aggregated level of price pet and the exogenous but not completely observable
state variable w˜t :
pt(j) = α1 + β1p
e
t + δw˜t (2.1)
where α1, δ are known constant parameters and w˜t is the estimated value of the exoge-
nous cost push shock which can negatively affect the profit. The cost push shock wt is
not observed in period t; however, every producer has access to the historical data of
its past realisation of {ws}.
This model is very similar to the cobweb model as presented in Kaldor (1934),
Ezekiel (1938) and more recently in Evans and Honkapohja (2003). It is known to
be stable when |β1| < 1. We will restrict our analysis to this particular case. In
equilibrium, each producer sets the same price, that is pt = pt(j).
2.2.1 OLS Learning
As wt is the only state variable, the producer expects the aggregated price to depend
on the variable
pt = α2 + β2wt, (2.2)
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where α2 and β2 are unknown parameters with producer estimates based on available
historical data {ps, ws} . The price expectation is then
pet = αˆ2,t−1 + βˆ2,t−1w˜t (2.3)
where αˆ2,t and βˆ2,t are estimated coefficients and w˜t is a proxy for wt. The classical
OLS-type learning model assumes that agents forecast future prices by running the OLS
regression using equation (2.2) and that at time t, the available information set consists
of the entire history of prices and the exogenous state variable {ps, ws}t−1s=0. Coefficients
αˆ2,t and βˆ2,t are OLS estimators on the information set {ps, ws}ts=0.
2.2.2 Learning with Bounded Memory
Learning with bounded memory in our paper simply means that the agent is only using
a limited number of observations T to form expectations.1 The forecast will be made
using the same OLS algorithm as in the classical case (2.3); however, we assume that
only a finite set of historical data, {ps, ws}t−1s=t−T , is used to estimate the coefficients.
Consequently, the estimators αˆ2,t and βˆ2,t are defined as follows:
βˆ2,t−1 =
∑T
i=1 [(wt−i − w¯t−1)(pt−i − p¯t−1)]∑T
i=1 [(wt−i − w¯t−1)2]
, (2.4)
αˆ2,t−1 = p¯t−1 − βˆ2,t−1w¯t−1, (2.5)
w¯t−1 =
1
T
T∑
i=1
wt−i, (2.6)
p¯t−1 =
1
T
T∑
i=1
pt−i. (2.7)
Finally, as the agents cannot observe the realization of wt at the time when they
set their prices, the forecast w˜t is used. The forecast is based on available historical
data {ws}t−1s=t−T , and consists of the weighted sum as in Mitra and Honkapohja (2003).
1This is similar to Honkapohja and Mitra (2003) where a simplified version of the model without
state variable is considered.
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Formally, w˜t can be written as
w˜t =
t−1∑
i=1
γi,twt−i, (2.8)
where γi,t is the expected probability that wt = wt−i and therefore,
t−1∑
i=1
γi,t = 1. (2.9)
Our set up covers an extensive range of models. For example, if wt follows a Markov
process with high persistency, the best prediction for wt is wt−1. In this case, γ1t = 1,
and γit = 0 for i > 1. In particular, for T = 2, γ1 = 1, γ2 = 0, the price pt follows a
simple autoregressive process with pet = pt−1. If wt is i.i.d. distributed, the best proxy
for wt might be w¯t−1. In this case, γi,t = 1T , and the price pt follows the AR(T ) process
with pet = p¯t−1. Our model will also work if γi,t corresponds to precautionary predictors
with larger weights attached to the worse realisations as in the Robust Control or The
Ambiguity Aversion theories.
The complete model consists of (2.1), (2.3), (2.8), (2.4), (2.5), (2.6) and (2.7). Our
aim is to show that pt is stationary for all T > 1.
First, we show that the aggregated price pt follows a Random Coefficient Autore-
gressive (RCAR) process.
Proposition 2 The actual price follows an autoregressive process of order T with ran-
dom coefficients as in (2.10)
pt = α1 + β1
(
T∑
i=1
Zi,tpt−i
)
+ δw˜t (2.10)
where
Zi,t =
1
T
+
(wt−i − w¯t−1)
((∑T
i=1 γi,t (wt−i − w¯t−1)
))
∑T
i=1 [(wt−i − w¯t−1)2]
. (2.11)
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2.3 Stationarity of Bounded Memory Learning
Proposition 2 allows us to write our model in the RCAR representation.
yt = εt +Mtyt−1, (2.12)
where Mt = β1Zt + S and S is a lower shift matrix,
yt =

pt
pt−1
....
pt−T+1

, Zt =

Z1,t Z2,t ... ZT,t
0 0 ... 0
.... ... ... ...
0 0 ... 0

and εt =

α1 + δw˜t
0
....
0

.
We begin our investigation of stationarity of the model (2.12) by setting up addi-
tional properties of coefficients Zi,t.
Lemma 3 For any realisation of wt, i)
∑T
i=1 Zi,t = 1 and ii)
∑T
i=1 Z
2
i,t ≤ 1.
Proof. It is convenient to define ki,t =
(wt−i−w¯t−1)
(
∑T
i=1(wt−i−1−w¯t−1)2)
1
2
. Then, according to (2.11),
Zi,t =
1
T
+ k′i,tγ
′
tkt, where ki,t can be any number with the following restrictions
T∑
i=1
ki,t = 0, (2.13)
T∑
i=1
k2i,t = 1. (2.14)
Now we can compute:
T∑
i=1
Z2i,t =
T∑
i=1
(
1
T
+ ki,tγ
′
tkt
)2
=
1
T
+ (γ′tkt)
2
. (2.15)
Maximisation of (2.15) subject to constraints (2.13) and (2.14) implies (γ′kt)
2 =
∑T
i=1 γ
2
i,t−
1
T
(∑T
i=1 γi,t
)2
at the maximum. Evaluating (2.15) entails
∑T
i=1 Z
2
i,t =
1
T
+ (γ′kt)
2 ≤
1
T
+
(
1− 1
T
)
= 1.
Lemma 3 also implies that |Zi,t| < 1. For further discussion, it is convenient to define
a random matrix Gt,n =
∏
k=1,n
(Mt−k). To show that it is finite, we will first establish the
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boundaries for every element of such a matrix.
Proposition 4 Consider matrix Mt−k such that Mt−k = β1Zt−k+S, where S is a lower
shift matrix, |β1| < 1 and element zi,j of matrix Zt−k satisfies
|z1,j| ≤ 1,
zi,j = 0, if i > 1.
Then, for any memory length T and β˜ ∈ (β1, 1), there exists a finite boundary cT such
that for any n, every element of the product of n matrixes, Gt,n, is bounded in absolute
value by cT β˜
n and therefore
|Gt,n| < cT β˜nJ,
where J is a T × T matrix of ones.
Proof. See Appendix 2.5.1.
Having established these results, we could investigate the stationarity of yt by prov-
ing the existence of the unconditional expectations E [yt] and E [yty
′
t].
Proposition 5 Process (2.12) is covariance stationary if there exist unconditional ex-
pectations of E [|εt|] and E [|εtε′t|] .
Proof. To prove stationarity, we will iterate the backward expression (2.12):
yt = εt +Mtyt−1 = εt +Mtεt−1 +MtMt−1yt−1 =
∞∑
k=0
Gt,kεt−k. (2.16)
First, we will prove that the expectation of yt is finite by applying proposition 4:
E [yt] < E [|yt|] < E
[ ∞∑
k=0
|Gt,k||εt−k|
]
< JcTE
[
|εt|
∞∑
k=0
β˜n
]
=
cT
1− β˜
J [E|εt|] .
Thus, we have proved that E [|yt|] is finite if E [|εt|] exists. To complete the proof, we
need to show that E [yty
′
t] is also finite:
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yty
′
t = εtε
′
t +Mtyt−1ε
′
t + εty
′
t−1M
′
t +Mtyt−1y
′
t−1M
′
t . (2.17)
We iterate it backwards to obtain:
yty
′
t =
∞∑
k=0
Gt,k
[
εt−kε′t−k +Mt−kyt−k−1ε
′
t−k + εt−ky
′
t−k−1M
′
t−k
]
Gt,k.
Finally, we will show that the expectations of the absolute value of the product are
bounded2:
E [|yty′t|] = E
∞∑
k=0
[|Gt,k| [|εt−kε′t−k|+ |Mt−k||yt−k−1||ε′t−k|+ |εt−k||y′t−k−1||M ′t−k||] |Gt,k|]
< c2TJ (E [|εtε′t|] + JE [|yt|]E [|ε′t|] + E [|εt|]E [|y′t|] J) J
∞∑
k=0
β˜2k
= c2TJ (E [|εtε′t|] + JE [|yt|]E [|ε′t|] + E [|εt|]E [|y′t|] J) J
1
1− β˜2
.
Another interesting implication of Proposition 4 is that the spectral radius of Mt is
smaller than one.
Lemma 6 For any realization of the stochastic matrix Mt, its eigenvalues are less than
one in absolute value.
Proof. ConsiderGn = (Mt)
n . Applying proposition 4 we can claim that |Gn| < cT β˜nJ :
lim
n→∞
(Mt)
n = 0
which is necessary and sufficient for eigenvalues to be less than one in absolute value.
2We use that |Mt| < J.
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2.4 Conclusion
In this paper, we have investigated properties of econometric (OLS-type) learning with
a bounded memory. We have shown that the eigenvalues of the transition matrix lie
in the unit circle for any length of memory T. Furthermore, we have found that the
price pt follows a covariance stationary process. Our results could be tested in a DSGE
framework, similarly to Berardi and Galimberti (2014).
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2.5 Technical Appendix
2.5.1 Proof of Proposition 4
For any memory length T , and constant β˜ > β, there exists a boundary cT such that
every element of the product of n matrices Mt is bounded in absolute value by cT β˜
n :
|Gt,n|ij =
∣∣∣∣∣ ∏
i=1,n
(Mt−i)
∣∣∣∣∣
ij
< cT β˜
n, (2.18)
where the matrix Mt can be represented as follows
Mt = βZt + S, (2.19)
where Zt has the form of
Zt =

Z1,t Z2,t ... ZT−1,t
0 0 ... 0
.... ... ... ...
0 0 ... 0

, (2.20)
where each element Zi,t is smaller than 1 in absolute value, |Zi,t| < 1; and S is the lower
shift matrix
S =

0 0 ... 0 0
1 0 ... 0 0
0 1 ... 0 0
.... ... ... ... ...
0 0 ... 1 0

. (2.21)
Proof. First we will compute the product
G =
∏
i=1,n
(Mt−i) = (β1Zt−1 + S) (β1Zt−2 + S) .... (β1Zt−n + S) (2.22)
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using the property of matrix S. For any matrix A, the first row of SA is zero. Moreover,
if the first k rows of A are zeros, then the first of k + 1 rows of SA are also zeros.
To compute the product (2.22) we need to sum up the products of n matrixes, each
of them is either Z or S. However, if S appears more than T − 1 times, the product is
zero. Therefore, we can restrict our attention to only those cases when S appears less
than T times.
The number of products with S being exactly on k places is n!/k!/(n−k)! and therefore,
the total number of non-zero products is less than n!/((T − 1)!(n− T + 1)!)× (T − 1).
Moreover, we can claim that every component is a matrix with elements less than
(βz)n−T , where z = max
i
|Zi,t| ≤ 1. Therefore, every element of
[(β1Zt−1 + S) (β1Zt−2 + S) .... (β1Zt−n + S)]ij <
n!
(T − 2)!(n− T + 1)!β
n−T < nTβn−T .
Consider the sequence {an}, defined as an = nTβn−T ,
an+1
an
=
(
n+ 1
n
)T
β.
Let β˜ ∈ (β, 1), then we can find n∗(β˜, T, β), such that for any n > n∗,
an+1
an
=
(
n+ 1
n
)T
β < β˜, (2.23)
in particular
n∗ = ceil
( β˜
β
)1/T
− 1
−1 .
It follows from (2.23) that for any positive k
an∗+k < β˜
kan∗ = β˜
kn∗Tβn
∗−T . (2.24)
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To complete the proof we define cT
cT = max
n≤n∗
(
anβ˜
−n
)
.
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Chapter 3
A comment on:“Capital regulation
and monetary policy with fragile
banks”
Abstract
This paper comments on Angeloni and Faia (2013, Journal of Monetary Economics), a
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with a risky banking sector. We identify
the sources of inefficiency in the model and disentangle the channels through which
banks choose a high level of leverage. We explain that their assumptions that gen-
erate banks over-borrowing feature lead to the return on assets and the bankruptcy
probability that are unrealistically high. Next, we modify the model by incorporating
the banking sector of Gertler and Karadi (2011) into the AF model and show that the
calibration result improves.
67
68 CHAPTER 3. A COMMENT ON ANGELONI AND FAIA (2013)
3.1 Introduction
Angeloni and Faia (2013), AF henceforth, incorporate a potential bank failure into
a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model, proposing a framework in
which the interaction between monetary policy and bank risk can be analyzed. In
short, the following is what their model can generate. When the economy is hit by
positive productivity shock, output goes up, inflation goes down, and a Taylor-rule
type policy lowers the nominal interest rate, as can happen in a standard DSGE model.
The lower nominal interest rate then encourages banks to borrow more, raising bank
leverage, aggregate investment, and output. This is the amplification of a standard
DSGE mechanism. Similarly, when the economy is hit by an expansionary monetary
policy shock, the lowered nominal interest rate encourages banks to borrow and invest
more, again leading to amplification. In the meantime, the higher leverage by banks
leads to higher chance of bank failure and potential welfare loss by default cost.
Novel as it is, AF do not clearly tell how excessive bank leverage can arise in their
model, nor whether the equilibrium bank leverage in their model is suboptimal. In
this article, we demonstrate that their equilibrium bank leverage is indeed suboptimal.
We identify the source of inefficiency in their model and disentangle the mechanism
through which banks’ excessive borrowing arises. We find that this very mechanism
makes it difficult to obtain desirable calibration outcome. Next, we modify the AF
model by taking Gertler and Karadi’s (2011) way of modeling the banking sector. We
explain the source of inefficiency in this modification and study the calibration result
in comparison with the original AF model.
There are a few minimum required features for a desirable model. First, banks
borrowing to some extent should benefit the society but too much borrowing should
harm the society so that the socially optimal bank leverage is “interior” (that is, neither
zero nor infinity). For this, AF assume that physical capital can be funded only by
banks and that banks cannot issue stocks: that is, investment must be funded by
internal equity and deposits only. Also, if the bank cannot fully repay depositors, there
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is default cost. These two combined give a positive role to a small, but not too high,
bank leverage.
Second, the equilibrium level of leverage that is chosen by individual banks should
be different from what the social planner would choose subject to the same constraints.
The choice of the bank’s objective turns out to be a delicate issue. There must be a
source of constrained inefficiency, or in other words, the bank must fail to internalize
something when it selects its leverage. One possible story is that the bank maximizes
the stockholder’s payoff, and in the presence of deposit insurance or implicit government
guarantee, the degree of leverage chosen by the bank does not have a direct effect on the
bank’s borrowing cost, allowing it to take an excessive risk. In such a story, what the
bank fails to internalize is the potential cost of bank failure borne by tax-payers. AF
take a somewhat different approach without explicitly stating the source of inefficiency.
They assume that when the bank chooses the leverage, the objective is the rate of return
to bank asset minus a state-dependent management fee. Once the model induces banks
to choose too high leverage in equilibrium, it follows that there is a role of capital
requirement in the model, allowing for a normative analysis for the optimal capital
regulation.
Once the channels through which the bank takes excessive leverage relative to the
socially optimal level are made clearer, we have a better interpretation of calibration
results. We claim that the state-dependent management fee plays an important role in
the AF model and this fee must be sufficiently high for the model to work. When the
model is calibrated, this leads to a low return to bank capitalists and hence a very low
level of investment and a very high level of return on investment.
Next, we consider a modification by modeling the banking sector in the way of
Gertler and Karadi (2011) (we call it ‘GK’ hereafter). The source of inefficiency now
comes from the banks maximizing the shareholder’s payoff. When banks choose their
leverage ratio, they fail to internalize the potential default cost on lenders, resulting in
an excessively high level of bank leverage. At the same time, the model could achieve
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a neither zero nor infinite level of banks borrowing because of the financial constraint
in the GK model: the bank’s ability to absorb funds is limited by the internal bank
equity within the bank. Consequently, when the model is calibrated, the return to bank
capitalists is not as low as that in AF model and therefore, the return on investment
can be calibrated to fit the empirical data. Meanwhile, the new source of inefficiency
retains the over-borrowing feature. The comparison between the AF model and the
modified model highlights how different ways of creating inefficiency lead to different
features in calibration.
Because we never know the true macroeconomic mechanism, all macroeconomic
models are in a sense “geocentric models”. Geocentric models are still useful in making
possible channels more visible and perhaps also in forecasting phenomena that the
model was originally designed to explain. In the field of asset pricing, for example,
because the goal is mainly about forecasting, the model can be evaluated based on
how many moments and correlations can be matched to those of data. Geocentric
models can be harmful, however, when they are used to get normative implications
such as desirable policies. That is why we should at least be clear about the source
of inefficiency, and about how a policy counteracts it. Comparing different models
that drive similar quantitative results is, therefore, a meaningful line of research in
quantitative macroeconomics. This paper is one such attempt.
The rest of the paper is as follows: Section 2 describes the AF model. Section
3 discusses the source of inefficiency and shows calibration results in the AF model.
Section 4 shows the modification of the model and Section 5 shows its simulation
results. Section 6 concludes.
3.2 The Model
This section briefly describes the original model from Angeloni and Faia (2013). There
are six sectors in the model: households, goods producers, capital producers, banks,
the central bank, and the government. The banking sector is the novel part in AF,
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and the other sectors are standard in dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE)
frameworks.
3.2.1 Households
A representative household has a continuum of members with mass 1, where a fraction
f of them are workers and the remaining 1 − f are bank capitalists1. Workers supply
labor to firms to earn wages, and bank capitalists work in a financial intermediary
and get a lump-sum payment of bank dividends when they exit the banking sector.
Household maximizes the following discounted sum of utilities:
Et
+∞∑
τ=t
βτ−tU(Cτ , Nτ ) =
+∞∑
τ=t
βτ−t
[
C1−στ − 1
1− σ + η ln(1−Nτ )
]
, (3.1)
where Et(·) denotes the conditional expectation given the information at time t, Ct is
consumption, Nt is labour hours, β is the time discount factor, σ is risk aversion and η
is the weight of labor disutility to the utility of consumption. The budget constraint is
given by
Pt(Ct + Tt) +Dt = WtNt +Rt−1(1− ζt)Dt−1 + Πt + Θt, (3.2)
where Pt is the price of aggregate consumption goods, Tt is the tax that households pay
to the government, Dt is deposits, Wt is nominal wage, Θt is the net income transferred
from goods producers, Πt is the payment received from the banking sector, Rt is the
contractual return of deposits from time t to t+ 1, and ζt is the expected loss incurred
by one unit of deposits due to possible bank runs. In every period, household chooses
consumption, labor supply and deposits (Ct, Lt, Dt) to maximize (1) given (Pt,Wt, Rt).
The optimality condition gives the Euler equation and labor supply function:
Et
[
β(1− ζt+1) Rt
pit+1
Cσt
Cσt+1
]
= 1, (3.3)
1In every period, some workers become bank capitalists, and some bank capitalists exit the banking
sector to become workers. The fractions of workers and bank capitalists are constant over time.
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wt ≡ Wt
Pt
= η
Cσt
1−Nt , (3.4)
where wt is the real wage rate, and pit+1 =
Pt+1
Pt
is the inflation rate.
3.2.2 Goods Producers
The final good is produced from a variety of differentiated intermediate goods Yt(i),
i ∈ [0, 1] according to a constant-return-to-scale technology. So the aggregate final good
is
Yt =
(∫ 1
0
Y (i)
−1

t di
) 
−1
. (3.5)
where  > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between various goods. Intermediate good
producer i uses labour and capital input to produce differentiated intermediate goods
Yt(i) through a Cobb-Douglas production function:
Yt(i) = AtKt(i)
αNt(i)
1−α, (3.6)
where At is the total factor productivity, and Kt(i) and Nt(i) are the capital and labour
inputs. Each good producer has monopolistic power so he can set the price of their
own products. According to (3.5), producer i faces a downward sloping demand curve:
Yt(i) =
(
Pt(i)
Pt
)−
Yt, (3.7)
where Pt(i) is the price of good i, and the aggregate price level Pt is given by
Pt =
(∫ 1
0
Pt(i)
1−di
) 1
1−
. (3.8)
They face a convex cost for adjusting the price of their goods (a la Rotemberg (1982)):
ϑ
2
(
Pt(i)
Pt−1(i)
− 1
)2
Pt, (3.9)
3.2. THE MODEL 73
where ϑ > 0 is the degree of price rigidity.2 If ϑ > 0, this results in nominal rigidity
in the economy. In every period, each good producer chooses the capital and labour
inputs (Kt(i), Nt(i)), and sets the price level Pt(i) to maximize the expected discounted
real profit:
Et
+∞∑
τ=t
Λt,τ
[
Pτ (i)
Pτ
Yτ (i)− Wτ
Pτ
Nτ (i)− Zτ
Pτ
Kτ (i)− ϑ
2
(
Pτ (i)
Pτ−1(i)
− 1
)2]
, (3.10)
subject to the production constraint AτKτ (i)
αNτ (i)
1−α =
(
Pt(i)
Pt
)−
Yτ for every period.
In (3.10), Zt is the rental rate of capital, and Λt,τ is the household’s stochastic discount
factor which takes the form
Λt,τ = β
τ−tC
σ
t
Cστ
. (3.11)
Let mt denote the Lagrange multiplier of the production constraint at period t, which is
interpreted as the cost of making an extra unit of production. In symmetric equilibrium,
we have Pt(i) = Pt, and the optimality condition is given by
Wt
Pt
= (1− α)mtAt
(
Kt
Nt
)α
. (3.12)
Zt
Pt
= αmtAt
(
Nt
Kt
)1−α
. (3.13)
(pit − 1)pit = 
ϑ
(
mt − − 1

)
Yt + Et [Λt,t+1(pit+1 − 1)pit+1] . (3.14)
After the log-linearzation of (3.14), we get the New Keynesian Phillips curve.
3.2.3 Capital Producers
Competitive capital producers accumulate physical capital subject to adjustment costs:
Kt+1 = (1− δ)Kt + ξ
(
It
Kt
)
Kt, (3.15)
2Other DSGE models with Rotemberg type nominal rigidity assume that the price adjustment cost
is proportionate to the aggregate output level.
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where It is investment, and ξ
(
It
Kt
)
= %1
(
It
Kt
)1−v
1−v + %2.
3 The capital producer chooses
investment level It to maximize the following expected discounted profit subject to
(3.15):
Et
+∞∑
t=τ
Λt,τ
(
Zτ
Pτ
Kτ − Iτ
)
, (3.16)
Let Qt+1 denote the Lagrange multiplier of the constraint (3.15), and it is the real price
of capital Kt+1. The optimal solution is given by
Qt+1ξ
′
(
It
Kt
)
= 1. (3.17)
Et
Λt,t+1Zt+1/Pt+1 +Qt+2
(
1− δ + ξ( It+1
Kt+1
)− ξ′( It+1
Kt+1
) It+1
Kt+1
)
Qt+1
 = 1 (3.18)
The expression
Zt+1/Pt+1+Qt+2
(
1−δ+ξ( It+1
Kt+1
)−ξ′( It+1
Kt+1
)
It+1
Kt+1
)
Qt+1
in (3.18) is the real return of
holding one unit of capital from time t + 1 to t + 2. So the real return of capital from
t to t+ 1, denoted as
RAt
pit+1
, is given by:
RAt
pit+1
=
Zt/Pt +Qt+1
[
(1− δ)− ξ′( It
Kt
) It
Kt
+ ξ( It
Kt
)
]
Qt
. (3.19)
3.2.4 The Banking Sector
In AF, it is assumed that banks choose a number of assets (Lt) to invest in, and in
equilibrium, Lt = Kt holds. These investment projects pay off one period after and
require initial funds. The funds are composed of bank capital (Bt) from bank capitalists
and deposits (Dt) collected from households. The bank balance sheet is:
QtLt = Dt +Bt, (3.20)
3The adjustment cost is from Jermann and Quadrini (2012) to capture the pro-cyclicality of asset
prices.
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where Lt is the number of investment projects and Qt is the price of the project, Dt
is deposits, and Bt is bank capital. Bank managers work for banks in exchange for a
state-dependent management fee. They make decisions on the bank capital structure
(equivalently, the deposits issuance level) and choose investment projects given the
deposit rate Rt and the average return on projects R
A
t . However, the actual return
on the project is random: it equals to the average return RAt plus a random variable
xt+1 that follows a uniform distribution over [−h, h]. The project goes through two
stages before it matures. In the first stage, bank managers and depositors know the
actual return of the project RAt +xt+1, and depositors decide whether to withdraw early.
If the depositors do so, bank managers have to liquidate the project before maturity
to meet depositors’ demand, which causes a constant fraction c of loss on the project
(0 < c < 1). The second stage is simply the procedure of early liquidation, or the time
for maturity if early liquidation does not happen. Depositors choose to withdraw early
when the actual return on the project is too low to be fully repaid. If it happens, the
bank manager is forced to liquidate the project early, and the bank becomes insolvent.
In the AF model, depositors choose to run only when banks have insolvency problem,
and all depositors receive equal payoff. This type of bank runs is a la Allen and Gale
(1998).4
Following is the timeline: at the beginning of time t, the bank chooses the level
of deposits they issue (Dt) and funds investment projects given the average return of
investment projects RAt and the deposit rate Rt. At the first stage, the actual return on
the project xt+1 is realized. When it is too low to repay to the depositors, depositors run
on the bank, and the bank manager liquidates the project before maturity. In this case,
the bank is insolvent and exits the banking sector after the liquidation procedure. When
the return is high enough to repay depositors, depositors do no run on the bank, and
bank capitalists retain their profit as bank capital. Another round of new investment
projects start.
4In AF, there is no sequential services for withdrawal as in Diamond and Dybvig (1983). Thus,
multiple equilibria are not considered. That is to say, for such realization of return on the project that
both bank-run and no bank-run equilibrium exist, the no bank-run equilibrium is selected.
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In AF, one further assumption is made regarding the bank’s liquidation before
maturity: the bank manager obtains better knowledge about the liquidation the project.
Let λ denote the ratio of the liquidation value of other agents to that of the bank
manager, so we have 0 < λ < 1.
In every period, the bank manager decides the capital structure of the bank by
choosing the level of deposits Dt to maximize the expected return of capitalists and
depositors (we also call them ‘outsiders’ hereafter). Equivalently, given the bank capital
(Bt) in the bank, the bank manager makes the decision on the deposit share dt which
is defined as a ratio of deposits to the value of investment projects:
dt =
Dt
QtLt
. (3.21)
There will be three different cases depending on different realizations of the return on
asset RAt + xt+1, bank balance sheet structure dt, and the deposit rate Rt from time t
to t+ 1.
Case A: run for sure: It happens when the realized payoff of projects is too low
for the bank to repay the depositors, that is, (RAt + xt+1)QtLt < RtDt (i.e. xt+1 <
Rtdt−RAt ). In this case, depositors run on the bank and the bank manager liquidate the
project before maturity. As residual claimants, bank capitalists get nothing. Depositors
can get λ(1− c)(RAt + xt+1)QtLt if they liquidate the project by themselves. How the
bank manager and depositors split the remainder of the liquidated project (1− λ)(1−
c)(RAt + xt+1)QtLt depends on their bargaining powers. For simplicity, it is assumed
that they split the remainder equally, so the bank manager gets (1 − λ)(1 − c)(RAt +
xt+1)QtLt/2, and depositors get (1 + λ)(1− c)(RAt + xt+1)QtLt/2. The total return on
assets for outsiders is (1 + λ)(1− c)(RAt + xt+1)/2.
Case B: run only without the bank : The realization of return on project is high
enough to repay the depositors if the bank manager extracts funds from the project
, but not enough when other agents extract the funds, that is, λ(RAt + xt+1)QtLt <
RtDt < (R
A
t + xt+1)QtLt. In this case, the bank manager avoid the run, so depositors
3.2. THE MODEL 77
Table 3.1: Payoffs to depositors, bank capitalists and bank managers
Case A Case B Case C
Realizations of xt+1 [−h,Rtdt −RAt ] [Rtdt −RAt , Rtdtλ −RAt ] [Rtdtλ −RAt , h]
Bank condition Run for sure Banks avoid the run No bank run possibility
Depositors (1)
(1+λ)(1−c)(RAt +xt+1)
2
QtLt RtDt RtDt
Capitalists (2) 0
(RAt +xt+1)−Rtdt
2
QtLt [
(1+λ)(RAt +xt+1)
2
−Rtdt]QtLt
Bank managers
(1−λ)(1−c)(RAt +xt+1)
2
QtLt
(RAt +xt+1)−Rtdt
2
QtLt
(1−λ)(RAt +xt+1)
2
QtLt
(1) + (2)
(1+λ)(1−c)(RAt +xt+1)
2
QtLt
(RAt +xt+1)+Rtdt
2
QtLt
(1+λ)(RAt +xt+1)
2
QtLt
get paid fully RtDt. It is assumed that bank capitalists and the bank manager split
the proceeds after deposits payment equally, so they get [(RAt + xt+1)QtLt − RtDt]/2,
and depositors and bank capitalists get [(RAt + xt+1) +Rtdt]QtLt/2 in total. The total
return of assets for both is [(RAt + xt+1) +Rtdt]/2.
Case C: no run for sure: The realization of the return on project is high enough to
repay the depositors even if bank capitalists extract the funds, so λ(RAt + xt+1)QtLt >
RtDt. In this case, depositors get RtDt for sure. Bank capitalists can get λ(R
A
t +
xt+1)QtLt − RtDt if they extract the funds by themselves, and this is the lower bound
of their payoff. Because the bank manager can extract (RAt + xt+1)QtLt − RtDt, she
and the bank capitalist split the extra return equally. So the bank manager obtains
(1−λ)(RAt +xt+1)QtLt/2, and bank capitalists get (1+λ)(RAt +xt+1)QtLt/2−RtDt. The
total return of assets for outsiders is (1 + λ)(RAt + xt+1)/2. We summarize the payoffs
to depositors, bank capitalists and bank managers in Table 3.1 when the realization of
the return xt+1 lies within different intervals.
Above all, the ex-ante return of assets to outsiders, denoted as ROutsidert , is
ROutsidert =
1
2h
∫ Rtdt−RAt
−h
(1 + λ)(1− c)(RAt + xt+1)
2
dxt+1
+
1
2h
∫ Rtdt
λ
−RAt
Rtdt−RAt
RAt + xt+1 +Rtdt
2
dxt+1 +
1
2h
∫ h
Rtdt
λ
−RAt
(1 + λ)(RAt + xt+1)
2
dxt+1.(3.22)
AF assume that the bank manager chooses the capital structure dt to maximize the
expected return of assets in expression (3.22), and they show that the optimal capital
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structure is
dt =
1
Rt
RAt + h
2− λ+ c(1 + λ) .
5 (3.23)
The optimal dt satisfies the condition
Rtdt
λ
− RAt > h and hence, case C disappears.
Overall, the expected return of holding one unit of deposit from time t to t+ 1 is
Rt
(
1
2h
∫ Rtdt−RAt
−h
(1 + λ)(1− c)(RAt + xt+1)
2Rtdt
dxt+1 +
1
2h
∫ h
Rtdt−RAt
dxt+1
)
, (3.24)
and the probability of bank run happening from time t to t+ 1 is
φt+1 =
1
2h
∫ Rtdt−RAt
−h
dxt+1 =
Rtdt −RAt + h
2h
. (3.25)
AF denotes gt+1 as the expected loss conditional on bank run, so φt+1gt+1 is the expected
loss when holding one unit of deposit, and it equals ζt+1 in Eq. (3.3):
ζt+1 = φt+1gt+1. (3.26)
According to the expression (3.24) and (3.25), we can derive the expression of gt+1 as
gt+1 = 1− (1 + λ)(1− c)
4
(1 +
RAt − h
Rtdt
). (3.27)
Note that AF assume that the leverage does not affect the bank’s cost of borrowing,
Rt, which resembles the effect of people’s (wrong) expectations for government bailout.
At the end of every period, it is assumed that a fraction θ of bank capitalists remain
in the banking sector. Bank capital accumulates from the payoff retained by bank
capitalists, so aggregate bank capital evolves as
Bt+1 =
θ
pit+1
%BKt+1QtKt, (3.28)
5The interior solution exists when the parameter values satisfy two conditions: (1−λ)
2
λ −c(λ+1) > 0
and λ < 12−λ+c(1+λ) < 1. Both conditions hold in the computational experiment when λ = 0.45,
h = 0.35 and c = 0.2. The derivations of the optimization problem is shown in their online Appendix.
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where %BKt+1 is bank capitalists’ average return of assets.
6 Since there are a lot of invest-
ment projects, the average return is given by
%BKt+1 =
1
2h
∫ h
Rtdt−RAt
(
RAt + xt −Rtdt
2
)
dxt+1 =
(RAt + h−Rtdt)2
8h
. (3.29)
3.2.5 Resource Constraint and Monetary Policy
The government has a balanced budget so that the lump-sum tax is equal to the exoge-
nous government purchase: Tt = Gt. Since price adjustment cost and the loss caused by
bank runs are paid in real units, the economy’s aggregate resource constraint is given
by: [
1− ϑ
2
(pit − 1)2
]
Yt −∆t = Ct + It +Gt, (3.30)
where ∆t represents the aggregate cost for bank runs:
∆t =
1
2h
∫ Rtdt−RAt
−h
c(RAt + xt+1)QtKtdxt+1 =
c
4h
[
(Rtdt)
2 − (RAt − h)2
]
QtKt. (3.31)
In labour market equilibrium, Labour supply equals to labour demand, The central
bank conducts the monetary policy following a Taylor–type rule:
ln
(
Rt
R¯
)
= (1− br)
[
bpi ln
(pit
p¯i
)
+ bY ln
(
Yt
Y¯
)]
+ br ln
(
Rt−1
R¯
)
+ ln
(
Mt
M¯
)
, (3.32)
where br, bpi, bY are policy parameters, and Mt is the monetary shock in the Taylor
rule. The expansionary monetary policy corresponds to a negative shock of Mt. All the
variables in the policy rule are log-deviations from the steady state, and the notation
with ‘bar’ is the steady state of the variable.
Following are the sequence of actions during time period t: (i) The capital Kt is
given at the beginning of time t. (ii) Shocks At and Mt realize. (iii) Households
choose (Ct, Nt, Dt) given (wt, Rt, ζt+1), final good producers choose (Kt, Nt, Pt(i)) given
(Zt
Pt
, wt, Pt), capital producers choose It given (
Zt
Pt
, Kt), banks choose dt given (Rt, R
A
t ),
6AF treat %BKt+1 as net return (p. 315, Eq. (8)). This typo is corrected here.
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where (wt,
Zt
Pt
, RAt ) are determined by the markets and Rt is chosen by the central bank.
In summary, the equilibrium of the model is defined as (Ct, Rt, Dt, Nt, wt, Yt, Kt,
Zt
Pt
, pit,
It, Qt, R
A
t ) that satisfy Eqs. (3), (4), (6), (12), (13), (14), (16), (18), (20), (24), (31),
(33).
3.3 Discussion of AF Model
In the AF model, it is assumed that investment can be funded by bank capital and
deposits only. Households cannot lend to capital producers directly, so the funds that
are lent to the capital producers must go via banks. In this case, a higher level of
bank borrowing implies a higher level of investment and therefore, higher output and
consumption. Other things equal, it improves welfare when banks issue more deposits.
However, an excessively high level of borrowing can also do harm to the welfare. As
the level of borrowing goes beyond a certain point, it is possible that banks cannot
fully repay the depositors when the realization of outcome in investment projects is
very low. The early liquidation cost causes a loss of resource in the economy and lowers
the welfare. Under such circumstances, the higher the borrowing level is, the higher
the probability of bank runs and higher liquidation cost borne by households. From
the above, the issuance of some but not too much deposits can improve the welfare,
and the socially optimal level of bank leverage trades off these two opposite effects of
borrowing.
The level of bank borrowing in the AF framework is highly influenced by two as-
sumptions: First, bank managers maximize the combined return of bank capitalists
and depositors; Second, bank managers have bargaining power to take some payoff
from bank assets. The first assumption ensures that the borrowing level decided by
bank managers is finite,7 and the second guarantees that bank managers choose a level
of deposit ratio such that the probability of bank runs is positive. The reasons are as
7If bank managers maximize the payoff level instead of the return of payoff, the bank managers’
optimal decision is to borrow an infinite amount of deposits. The details of derivation are shown in
Appendix 3.6.4.
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follows.
When bank managers have advantage in liquidating projects, they either (i) take a
share of payoff from depositors in bank-run case or (ii) receive a share of proceeds from
bank capitalists in no-bank-run case. When the deposit ratio is as low as dt <
RAt −h
Rt
,
banks can always fully repay the depositors, so (i) is zero but (ii) is large; When the
deposit ratio is high enough so that there is possibility of bank runs (i.e., dt >
RAt −h
Rt
), a
higher level of dt enlarges the region of Case A and reduces the region of Case B, so the
bank manager gets more in (i) and less in (ii). However, bank managers could get a
larger fraction of bank assets in (ii) than in (i) because the liquidation advantage which
helps the bank to avoid runs in Case B allows bank managers to get higher payoff. In
this case, a higher level of dt reduces the payoff of bank managers and raises the return
of the outsiders. As a result, when bank manager maximizes the return of outsiders,
they choose the deposit ratio that opens the possibility of bank runs.8
Now we can identify sources of inefficiency in the AF model. When bank managers
set the combined return of both bank capitalists and depositors as objective, they take
into account the positive effect of a higher level of borrowing on the welfare, but only
to a certain extent as they do not take their own payoff into account. By considering
the return of depositors, they include the negative effect of the early liquidation cost
on the return of investment projects. This somehow includes the negative effect on the
aggregate resource in the economy, but only partially. The total bank assets are lent to
firms to rent capital and according to (3.6), the bank assets, which equals to the level of
physical capital, contribute a constant share α < 1 to the final goods production. From
(3.30), however, the liquidation cost is deducted from the final output in the resource
constraint. That is to say, when bank runs may occur, the negative effect of the early
liquidation cost on the aggregate resource is more severe than that on bank assets. As
a result, bank managers do not fully internalize its negative effect on the welfare and
undervalue the cost of bank runs. Thus, they choose a higher level of deposit level than
8If bank managers include themselves in their objective or equivalently if λ = 1, the possibility of
bank run is never optimal. The optimal leverage in that case is given by (3.37) in Section 3.3.1.
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the socially optimal level, which leads to a higher probability of bank runs and incurs
a higher waste of liquidation cost. This is one source of inefficiency.
Besides, the bank capital structure in AF yields another source of inefficiency. From
the bank capital structure in (3.23), the deposit ratio chosen by bank managers is in-
creasing in the average return on capital (RAt ) and is decreasing in the deposit rate (Rt).
As we will show in Section 4.2, either a positive productivity shock or an expansionary
monetary shock would lead to an increase in RAt and a decrease in Rt, so bank managers
would raise the deposit ratio and issue more deposits, resulting in an amplification ef-
fect on those shocks. The amplification effect would generate excessive bank risk and
economic fluctuations because a higher level of deposit ratio increases the probability of
bank runs. The excessive bank risk and volatility caused by the amplification effect has
a negative effect on the welfare and is not taken into consideration by bank managers
when they choose their bank capital structure. This is another source of inefficiency in
their model.
In short, banks choose a deposit ratio that is higher the socially optimal level because
of two reasons: First, they do not fully internalize the negative effect of the early
liquidation cost on the resource constraint; Second, they do not take into account the
excessive volatility caused by the amplification effect. The next section presents a
calibration exercise which shows that the bank capital structure (3.23) achieves a lower
welfare than that of banks taking no risk, verifying the over-borrowing feature of the
AF model.
3.3.1 The Calibration Exercise
In this section, we solve the steady state of variables in the AF model and compare
the welfare with that in the scenario in which bank managers choose a safe capital
structure. The welfare criteria are the conditional expected lifetime utility of households
to the second order approximation as in Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2007).9 We use
9By approximating the utility function to the second order, we take into account the transitional
effects from the non-stochastic steady states to stochastic steady states under different bank capital
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Table 3.2: Parameter values
Parameters and descriptions AF model Modified model
Hosueholds:
β time discount factor 0.995 0.99
σ risk aversion 2 2
η utility weight of labour 6.25 6.25
Producers:
α capital share 0.3 0.3
δ physical capital depreciation rate 0.025 0.025
v elasticity of asset prices to investment 0.5 0.5
%1 capital adjustment parameter 0.158 0.158
%2 capital adjustment parameter −0.025 −0.025
Retailers:
 elasticity of substitution 6 6
ϑ price adjustment cost 30 30
Banks:
h dispersion of corporate return 0.35 0.35
c cost of early liquidation 0.2 0.2
λ bank manager’s liquidation advantage 0.45 1
θ exogenous survival rate of banks 0.975 0.975
ω the fraction of initial net worth of new bankers N/A 0.005
Θ bank manager fraction of diversion N/A 0.44
Government:
GY steady state proportion of government purchase 0.25 0.25
bpi inflation coefficient of Taylor rule 1.5 1.5
bY output gap coefficient of Taylor rule 0.5 0.5
br lag coefficient of interest rate 0.6 0.6
consumption equivalent to compare the welfare under different bank capital structures.
It is the percentage increase (Γ) of household’s consumption needed under one bank
capital structure to reach the same level of welfare under the ‘better’ capital structure.
The parameter values used in the AF model are shown in the first column of Table
3.2, and they are specified as follows. The dispersion of return on investment project (h)
is chosen to be 0.35 to match the dispersion of US corporate returns in the data. The
survival rate of banks (θ) is set to be 0.975 so that banks stay in the banking sector for
10 years on average. The liquidation cost c is set by looking at the recovery rate which
is up to 80%− 90%, so c = 0.2 is used. The parameter values for other sectors are very
conventional. The elasticity of asset prices to investment is v = 0.5. The parameter
values of %1 = 0.158 and %2 = −0.025 are chosen to achieve the following two targets:
First, the steady state asset price Qt is 1; Second, the steady state investment is the
same as that without the adjustment cost.
The bank’s demand for deposits is given by (3.23), and the supply of deposits is
structures.
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from households as in the Euler equation (3.3). Writing them in the steady-state form
gives
d¯ =
1
R¯
R¯A + h
2− λ+ c(1 + λ) (3.33)
and
β(1− ζ¯)R¯ = 1, (3.34)
where
ζ¯ =
R¯d¯− R¯A + h
2h
[
1− (1 + λ)(1− c)
4
(
1 +
R¯A − h
R¯d¯
)]
. (3.35)
The aggregate bank capital evolve as (3.28) where %BKt+1 is the gross return on bank
asset. If we combine (3.20), (3.21), and (3.28) in the steady state form to eliminate Bt,
we can get
1− d¯ = θ%¯BK = θ (R¯
A + h− R¯d¯)2
8h
. (3.36)
By combing (3.34),(3.33), and (3.36), we can solve for the steady state of (dt, Rt, R
A
t ).
The other steady state variables can be derived by substituting the above results into
the equations in the steady state system.
In the second scenario, in which bank managers choose a safe bank capital structure,
the deposit ratio dSt is given by:
dSt =
RAt − h
Rt
. (3.37)
To avoid the possibility of bank runs, dSt is the highest level of deposit ratio that banks
could obtain at time t given the uniform distribution assumption. We call it “safe
banking” as in this case, banks can always fully repay the depositors. The steady state
values of the relevant variables in both scenarios are shown in the first two sub-columns
in Table 3.3. The first sub-column shows the steady state results in the AF model, and
the second sub-column is for the safe banking scenario. The parameter values we use
are the same as AF. Results show that although the risky bank capital structure in
AF achieves higher steady state values of total borrowing, output, and consumption,
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Table 3.3: Steady State Values
AF model Modified model
Variables Risky banking Safe banking
Risky banking
(baseline model)
Safe banking
Return on capital (%) RA 22.9% 23.5% 1.5% 1.3%
Return on deposits (%) R 6% 0.5% 1.1% 0.5%
Deposit ratio d 0.825 0.781 0.662 0.653
Bank run probability (%) φ 10.6% 0 0.6% 0
Conditional expected loss g 0.48 0 0.20 0
Total bank assets QK 0.294 0.280 4.112 4.918
Deposits D 0.243 0.218 2.721 3.215
Bank capital B 0.051 0.061 1.391 1.703
Labor N 0.3 0.295 0.3 0.301
Output Y 0.298 0.290 0.658 0.6945
Consumption C 0.211 0.210 0.388 0.398
Payoff to depositors 0.244 0.219 2.749 3.247
Payoff to capitalists 0.065 0.063 1.401 1.721
Payoff to bank managers 0.053 0.063 0 0
Welfare Γ 1.5% 0 2.6% 0
the safe banking gives higher welfare. It is because of the lower volatility of variables
without the risk of bank runs.
Also, it is worth noting that the steady state of return on capital RA seems very
high in both cases (22.9% in the AF model and 23.5% in the safe banking, respectively)
which imply unrealistically high quarterly corporate returns. In fact, the high return
on capital can be expected by the AF assumptions to manipulate a risky bank leverage
and excessively high level of borrowing. Recalling from Table 3.1, bank managers can
take half of the proceeds from bank capitalists in no-bank-run case (Case B) and get
a smaller share of payoff from depositors in bank-run case (Case A). In this situation,
raising the deposit ratio can reduce the proceeds that bank managers take from bank
capitalists and increase the payoff they take from depositors. Thus, a higher level of
deposit ratio reduces the return of bank managers and conversely raises the combined
return of the outsiders. As we can see from the last several rows of Table 3.3, bank
managers take quite a large share of payoff from bank capitalists in the steady state
and therefore, the payoff to the bank capitalists is very low. Also, bank capitalists take
2.5 percent (θ = 0.975) of bank capital out of the banking sector in every period. The
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above facts in the AF model lead to a very low steady-state bank capital and therefore,
an unrealistically high return on capital, RA.
To summarize, the assumptions that bank managers take a large share of proceeds
from bank capitalists in the no-bank-run case and that they maximize the combined
return of outsiders lead banks to choose a risky bank capital structure which exposes
banks to runs. These assumptions generate the inefficiency of over-borrowing in the AF
model, but inevitably, they also lead to the level of return on capital that is too high
compared to the data. This by-product cannot be eliminated by changing parameter
values within a reasonable range.
3.4 Modifying the Banking Sector
To modify the above undesirable feature in the original AF model, we abandon the
assumption that bank managers have the advantage in liquidating projects. Instead,
we assume that bank capitalists take the role of the bank managers to make balance
sheet decisions, so they own and manage banks by themselves. In the situation, bank
capitalists take all the proceeds if there is any. Also, we change the assumption that
the bank manager maximizes the rate of return to the outsiders combined. In the
AF model, this assumption is crucial for banks to take the risk of bank runs and to
borrow beyond the socially optimal level, and it is also an important assumption for
the existence of equilibrium and tractability. However, this assumption is unreasonable
in that the bank managers maximize the rate of return rather than the profit level.
By changing the above assumptions, the over-borrowing feature in the AF model also
vanishes, and there does not exist an equilibrium. Alternatively, we adopt a banking
model from Gertler and Karadi (2011) to remedy these issues. For simplicity, we assume
λ = 1 onward and call the bank capitalist who is both the owner and manager of the
bank ‘banker’. The following are the alternative assumptions in our modified model.
First, bankers maximize their own payoff only. This assumption in GK brings
about a different source of inefficiency: bankers do not fully internalize the cost of
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Table 3.4: Payoffs to depositors and bankers in the modified model
Case A∗ Case B∗
Realizations of xt+1 [−h,Rtdt −RAt ] [Rtdt −RAt , h]
Bank condition Bank run No bank run possibility
Depositors (1− c)(RAt + xt+1)QtLt RtDt
Bankers 0 [(RAt + xt+1)−Rtdt]QtLt
early liquidation caused by bank runs (if there is any), and it would lead bankers to
issue deposits beyond the socially efficient level. Second, a moral hazard problem of
banks and depositors is embedded into the model which ensures the existence of the
equilibrium and tractability. The above features of the GK model guarantee that the
banker’s ability to get funds is limited by their internal bank capital. For simplicity
and exposition purpose, we keep the notations in Section 2.4. Since the modifications
are the assumptions in the banking sector, the bank capital structure (3.23) will change
accordingly, but the other equations in the system remain. Depending on the realization
of the return of investment projects, there are two different cases which correspond to
Case A and Case B&C in the AF model.
Case A∗: Bank run happens when the bank cannot fully repay the depositors, i.e.,
(RAt +xt+1)QtLt < RtDt. Depositors run on the bank, so the banker has to liquidate the
project early and incurs a liquidation cost. After liquidation, the bank goes bankrupt.
The banker exits the banking sector with nothing because he is a mere residual claimant.
Depositors get (1− c)(RAt + xt+1)QtLt.
Case B∗: No bank run happens when depositors get the full payment RtDt, i.e.,
(RAt +xt+1)QtLt > RtDt. In this case, the banker obtains the leftover (R
A
t +xt+1)Qtst−
RtDt and keep it within the bank as bank capital. Table 3.4 summarizes the payoff to
depositors and the banker in both Cases A∗ and B∗.
At the end of each period, if the bank does not go bankrupt, the banker faces a
constant probability θ of staying in the banking sector. When bankers are forced to exit
the banking sector, they consume all their bank capital. The probability of bankruptcy
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is the same as φt+1 in (3.25). Instead of maximizing the rate of return on assets, the
bankers’ objective is to maximize the expected discounted terminal consumption when
they exit the banking sector:
Vt = maxEt
∞∑
τ=t+1
[
(1− θ)θτ−t−1Ξt,τBτ
]
, (3.38)
where Ξt,τ =
∏τ
i=t+1(1− φi)Λt,τ is the augmented discount factor of bankers.
Bankers care about their own payoff only. As long as the bankers make profit by
working as a financial intermediary, they keep accumulating bank capital until they
exit the banking sector. When the bank can fully repay depositors at the end of period
t, the bank capital accumulation function is given by
Bt+1 = (R
A
t + xt+1)QtLt −RtDt. (3.39)
Following the idea from Gertler and Karadi (2011), we adopt a moral hazard problem
in the banking sector: After the banker gets the deposits from households and before
lending to the investment projects, he has an outside option to divert a fraction Θ of
bank assets to his own family. When the diversion happens, the bank cannot repay
the depositors for sure and will go bankrupt. Knowing the possibility of diversion by
the banker, depositors limit their funds they lend to the bank to the extent that the
fraction of diversion is no more than the expected discounted ultimate bank capital
that the bank could get if the banker keeps the bank assets in the bank:
Vt ≥ ΘQtLt. (3.40)
We can solve the optimization problem of the banker by maximizing (3.38) subject
to (3.39) and (3.40). Define the bank leverage as the ratio of bank assets to bank
capital:
γt =
QtLt
Bt
=
1
1− dt . (3.41)
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The closed form of Vt is given by:
Vt(QtLt, Bt) = µtQtLt + νtBt, (3.42)
where the Lagrange multipliers (LMs) in (3.42) are recursively defined as
νt = EtΞt,t+1Ωt+1Rt, (3.43)
µt = EtΞt,t+1Ωt+1(RAt −Rt), (3.44)
Ωt+1 = 1− θ + θ(γt+1µt+1 + νt+1). (3.45)
Above, Ωt+1 is the shadow price of the bank capital tomorrow, νt is the bank’s private
cost of issuing deposits (or, the private value of a unit of bank capital), and µt is the
net profit of bank assets. As the borrowing constraint (3.40) is binding, by (3.41) and
(3.42), the optimal bank leverage ratio γt is
γt =
νt
Θ− µt , or dt =
νt + µt −Θ
νt
. (3.46)
As mentioned in Section 2.4, the bank assets are lent to firms, so QtLt = QtKt. If
we consider the evolution of bank capital in aggregate, the dynamics of new and old
bankers need to be taken into account. At the end of period t, new bankers enter the
banking sector with the initial net worth ωRAt QtKt, so the aggregate bank capital Bt
evolves as
Bt+1 = θ
[
1
2h
∫ h
Rtdt−RAt
(RAt + xt+1)dxt+1QtKt −RtDt
]
+ ωRAt QtKt. (3.47)
By embedding the moral hazard constraint into the banking model, banks face
balance sheet constraints endogenously determined by the internal bank capital owned
by banks. It also creates a different link between the riskiness of bank assets h and the
bank manager’s decisions on capital structures through asset prices. When h is high,
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the probability of bankruptcy increases (see (3.25)), and the net value of bank assets
νt and µt decrease due to a smaller discount factor Ξt,t+1, and banks tend to decrease
the borrowing. Hence the increase in h has a negative effect on bank leverage γt.
Most of all, bankers tend to borrow more than the socially optimal level as in
AF. While the modified model keeps the part that bankers do not take the excessive
volatility into consideration, it has a different source of inefficiency which is favorable to
excessive borrowing: the bankers maximize their own payoff and fail to internalize the
liquidation cost of bank runs. The moral hazard constraint (3.40) is not favorable to
excessive borrowing because it limits banks abilities to collect funds, but it guarantees
that the bank leverage is finite. Overall, the modified model generates an feature of
over-borrowing. In the next section, we illustrate the simulation results.
3.5 Simulation
3.5.1 Steady States
In this section, we compute the steady state of the modified model and show that our
model resolves the calibration problem of the AF model mentioned in section 3.3.1.
Meanwhile, the model is able to retain the over-borrowing feature of the AF model.
The parameter values we use for the modified model are shown in the second column
of Table 3.2, and they are the same as the original AF model except the time discount
factor that we use β = 0.99 for more reasonable steady state values of deposit rate
and corporate return.10 The new parameters introduced in the modified model are as
follows: To achieve a reasonable level of bank leverage ratio, we choose the initial net
worth of new bankers to be ω = 0.5% of the total bank assets and the banker’s fraction
of diversion to be Θ = 0.44.
As in Section 3.1, we also compare the steady state values of the modified model
10We calibrate the return on capital and the deposit return so that the quarterly credit spread is
about 30 basis points (the level during the great moderation). If we choose β = 0.995, either the credit
spread or the bank leverage becomes too low. Changing β from 0.995 to 0.99 does not change the
main results of the paper.
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with those of the safe banking scenario (see (3.37)). The last two sub-columns of Table
3.3 list the steady state values. The first sub-column is under (3.46), and the second
sub-column is under (3.37). As we can see from the table, the modified model can get
more reasonable values of quarterly return on bank assets 1.5% and the bankruptcy
probability 0.6%. And more, the modified model is able to retain the over-borrowing
feature of the AF model. Under the safe banking, the steady-state deposit ratio is lower,
but the total borrowing level is higher than that in the modified model. It is due to the
fact that there is no possibility of bank run in the safe banking, so no liquidation cost
is deducted from the resource constraint. Bankers can accumulate more bank capital
and therefore, it leads to a higher level of physical capital, output and consumption.
As a result, the safe banking gives higher welfare than that in our baseline model.
The fact that the welfare under our baseline model is lower than that under the
safe banking scenario implies that bankers borrow more than the socially optimal level.
However, the source of inefficiency is very different from that of the AF model. It is
the bankers overlooking the liquidation cost caused by bank runs that leads them to
borrow too much from households. In such framework, bank regulations which prevent
banks from issuing excessive deposits can be welfare improving.
3.5.2 Impulse Response Functions
In this section, we examine the impulse responses of variables to two types of shocks:
a positive technological shock (At) and an expansionary monetary shock (Mt). We
discuss the responses in our modified model as well as in the AF model to investigate
the different channels through which banks choose to increase the borrowing level in a
boom, resulting in an amplification effect.
We adopt the same setting as the AF model for both shocks. The log-deviation of
the total factor productivity Aˆt follows an autoregressive process of
Aˆt = ρAAˆt−1 + εAt , (3.48)
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where ρA = 0.95, ε
A
t is i.i.d. normal with mean 0 and standard deviation 0.056, and the
variable with ‘∧’ is its log-deviation from the steady state. The Taylor-type interest
rate rule is subject to a moderately persistent monetary shock Mt where
Mˆt = ρMMˆt−1 + εMt . (3.49)
The autocorrelation coefficient is ρM = 0.2 and the standard deviation of ε
M
t is 0.006.
11
The Modified Model
In the modified model, the bank leverage ratio in (3.46) is increasing in the shadow
value of bank capital (νt) and the net profit of bank assets (µt): A higher level of νt
implies that bank capital becomes more valuable, so bankers can issue more deposits
per unit of bank capital. A higher level of µt means that banks can get higher profit
per unit of bank asset, so it also relaxes the financial constraint and allows banks a
higher level of borrowing. Thus, the amplification effect of the banking sector is mainly
through the prices of bank capital and assets.
Figure 3.1 shows the responses to a one-standard-deviation monetary expansion in
the modified model. A negative shock to Mˆt in the interest rate rule (3.32) causes the
nominal interest rate (Rt) to decrease. With sticky prices, it lowers the real interest
rate and according to the Euler Equation (3.3), households choose to increase the
consumption (Ct), so the demand for final goods in Eq. (3.7) increases. Final good
producers choose to raise the prices of their goods, so the inflation rate (pit) increases.
A higher level of output induces investment to increase, and there is a delayed rise in
physical capital due to the capital adjustment cost. Because the increase in capital is
not as large as that in output and also because its increase is delayed, the rental rate
of capital (Zt
Pt
) goes up (see Eq. 3.13). Also, the capital adjustment cost generates the
pro-cyclicality of asset prices (Qt+1) and according to Eq. (3.17), the price of capital
(Qt+1) increases. As a result, a higher level of
Zt
Pt
and Qt+1 leads to a higher return on
11The parameter values for shocks are from the business cycle literature such as Rudebusch (2002).
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Figure 3.1: Impulse response to a one-standard-deviation monetary expansion in the modified
model
capital (RAt ). The above responses of variables to an expansionary monetary shock can
happen in a standard DSGE model.
As is shown in the figure, both the net profit of bank asset (µt) and the shadow
value of bank capital (νt) increase and by (3.46), both effects lead to a higher level
of bank leverage. By (3.44), the increase in RAt and the decrease in Rt cause the
net profit per unit of bank asset µt to rise. By (3.45), an increase in µt has a large
positive effect on the shadow price of the bank capital Ωt because it is amplified by
the bank leverage γt. Although a decrease in Rt has a negative effect on νt, the overall
response of νt is positive because the positive effect of Ωt+1 on νt is larger.
12 In short,
an expansionary monetary shock causes the bank leverage γt (alternatively, the deposit
ratio dt) to increase, which amplifies the positive effect of the shock on real variables
such as output and consumption.
12For more details of these mechanism in GK, see Liu (2016)
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Figure 3.2: Impulse response to a one-standard-deviation productivity increase in the modi-
fied model
Figure 3.2 shows the responses to a one-standard-deviation positive productivity
shock. The positive productivity shock raises the supply of final goods. To sell more
goods, firms lower the prices, so the inflation rate goes down. As the interest rate
rule responds largely to the inflation rate, the nominal interest rate drops accordingly.
The return on capital is influenced by the following effects: First, an increase in the
total factor productivity raises the marginal product of capital, so the rental rate of
capital (Zt/Pt) increases and it has a positive effect on R
A
t ; Second, due to an increase
in output and then investment, the asset price (Qt+1) goes up and it raises R
A
t ; Third,
the increased cost of capital adjustment dampens the increase in RAt . In general, the
overall effect on RAt is positive. A higher level of R
A
t and a lower level of Rt causes
the net profit of bank assets (µt) to increase. Similar to the expansionary monetary
shock, the private value of bank capital νt increases because of the positive response of
Ωt+1. All of these effects lead to an amplification effect on a productivity shock via the
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shadow values of bank asset and bank capital and bank leverage.
The AF Model
In the modified model, banks tend to raise their leverage after a positive shock because
the responses of RAt and Rt to shocks raises the shadow values of bank asset and
bank capital, which relax the borrowing constraint. Unlike our modified model, the
amplification channel is directly through the responses of Rt and R
A
t to shocks in the
AF model. According to the bank capital structure (3.23) in AF, the bank leverage
ratio is decreasing in the deposit rate (Rt) and is increasing in the return on capital
(RAt ). Since the modified model is the same as the AF model except for the banking
sector, the responses of variables to shock in other sectors in the AF model are similar.
When there is an expansionary monetary shock, for example, inflation and output goes
up, interest rate goes down, and the return on capital goes up due to the presence of
capital adjustment cost. In this situation, the cost of issuing deposits (Rt) is lower and
the average return of bank asset (RAt ) is higher. By (3.23), the bank chooses a higher
level of deposit ratio which causes an amplification effect. The similar idea applies to
a positive productivity shock.
In both the AF model and our modified model, the amplification effect induces
banks to borrow more after positive shocks, and it leads to a higher probability of bank
runs. In the modified model, a higher bank risk implies a higher overall liquidation cost
which has not been taken into consideration when bankers choose the leverage ratio. It
also causes excessive volatility and harms the welfare. That is to say, a countercyclical
macroprudential policy which controls the bank leverage in good times and encourages
deposit issuance in bad times can have a stabilizing effect on the economy and improve
the welfare.
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3.6 Concluding Remarks
Understanding the source of inefficiency in a macro model is as important as the quan-
titative results that it can generate. By making the source of inefficiency clear, we can
explain why some policies can counteract the inefficiency and improve welfare. This
paper identifies the source of inefficiency in Angeloni and Faia (2013) and demonstrates
that some undesirable features of the calibration results of their model stem from their
somewhat unnatural way of introducing inefficiency. This calls for an alternative way of
modeling banks’ over-borrowing feature in a DSGE model with risky banking system.
To achieve that, this paper embeds a banking model from Gertler and Karadi (2011)
into the AF model. Like Angeloni and Faia (2013), our modified model generates the
following features that are crucial for macroprudential policies to play a role: First,
banks take excessive leverage ratio relative to the socially optimal level. Second, banks
tend to borrow more when the economy is in a boom than in recession, leading to
amplification of macroeconomic shocks. The difference is, however, the way the model
creates inefficiency. In our modified model, the inefficiency is that bankers consider
only their own profit and do not internalize the potential cost of early liquidation on
the resources in the economy. The modified model improves the calibration of the AF
model.
Based on that, one further research topic is to find the optimal macroprudential
policy that has the best way to counteract the over-borrowing feature and the excessive
volatility due to the amplification effect.
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Appendix
3.6.1 Modified Model: System of Equations
Yt = AtK
α
t L
1−α
t . (3.50)[
1− ϑ
2
(pit − 1)2
]
Yt −∆t = Ct + It +Gt. (3.51)
∆t =
c
4h
QtKt
[
(Rtdt)
2 − (RAt − h)2
]
. (3.52)
Kt+1 = (1− δ)Kt + ξ
(
It
Kt
)
Kt, (3.53)
ξ′(
It
Kt
)Qt+1 = 1. (3.54)
RAt
pit+1
=
αmtAt
(
Nt
Kt
)1−α
+Qt+1
[
(1− δ)− ξ′( It
Kt
) It
Kt
+ ξ( It
Kt
)
]
Qt
. (3.55)
Et [Λt,t+1(1− ζt+1)]Rt = 1, (3.56)
Λt,t+1 = β
Cσt
Cσt+1
. (3.57)
ζt+1 = (Rtdt −RAt + h)
[
1 + c
4h
− 1− c
4h
RAt − h
Rtdt
]
. (3.58)
(1− α)mt Yt
Nt
=
ηCσt
1−Nt . (3.59)
QtKt = Dt +Bt; (3.60)
γt =
νt
Θ− µt , (3.61)
Ξt,t+1 = (1− φt+1)Λt,t+1. (3.62)
φt+1 =
RAt + h−Rtdt
2h
. (3.63)
µt = Ξt,t+1Ωt+1(R
A
t −Rt), (3.64)
νt = Ξt,t+1Ωt+1Rt, (3.65)
Ωt+1 = 1− θ + θ(γt+1µt+1 + νt+1). (3.66)
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Bt = θ
[
1
4h
(RAt + h+Rtdt−1)(R
A
t + h−Rtdt−1)Qt−1Kt−1 −RtDt−1
]
+ ωRAt Qt−1Kt−1.
(3.67)
γt =
QtKt
Bt
. (3.68)
dt =
Dt
QtKt
. (3.69)
(pit − 1)pit = 
ϑ
(mt − − 1

)Yt + Et [Λt,t+1(pit+1 − 1)pit+1] . (3.70)
ln
(
Rt
R
)
= (1− br)
[
bpi ln
(pit
pi
)
+ bY ln
(
Yt
Y
)]
+ br ln
(
Rt−1
R
)
+ Mˆt. (3.71)
3.6.2 Maximization Problem of Good Producers
Final good producers choose (Pt(i), Kt(i), Nt(i)) to maximize (3.10) subject to (3.5)
and (3.7). The Lagrangian is
L1 = Et
+∞∑
τ=t
Λt,τ
{
Pτ (i)
Pτ
Yτ (i)− Wτ
Pτ
Nτ (i)− Zτ
Pτ
Kτ (i)− ϑ
2
(
Pτ (i)
Pτ−1(i)
− 1
)2
−mτ
[(
Pτ (i)
Pτ
)−
Yτ − AτKτ (i)αNτ (i)1−α
]}
, (3.72)
where mt is the Lagrange multiplier. The first order conditions with respect to (w.r.t.)
Kt(i) and Nt(i) are
∂L1
∂Kt(i)
= −Zt
Pt
+ αmtAtKt(i)
α−1Nt(i)1−α = 0, (3.73)
∂L1
∂Nt(i)
= −Wt
Pt
+ (1− α)mtAtKt(i)αNt(i)−α = 0, (3.74)
After simplification, we can derive (3.13) and (3.12). The first order condition w.r.t.
Pt(i) is
∂L1
∂Pt(i)
= (1− )
(
Pt(i)
Pt
)−
Yt
Pt
− ϑ
(
Pt(i)
Pt−1(i)
− 1
)
1
Pt−1(i)
+ mt
(
Pt(i)
Pt
)−−1
Yt
Pt
+ϑΛt,t+1
(
Pt+1(i)
Pt(i)
− 1
)
Pt+1(i)
P 2t (i)
. (3.75)
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Simplifying (3.75) by Pt(i) = Pt and pit =
Pt
Pt−1
, we can get (3.14).
3.6.3 Maximization Problem of Capital Producers
Capital producers choose It to maximize (3.16) subject to (3.15).The Lagrangian is
L2 = Et
+∞∑
t=τ
Λt,τ
{
Zτ
Pτ
Kτ − Iτ +Qτ+1
[
(1− δ)Kτ + ξ
(
Iτ
Kτ
)
Kτ −Kτ+1
]}
, (3.76)
The first order conditions w.r.t. It and Kt+1 give (3.17) and (3.18).
3.6.4 Maximizing the Total Payoff to Everyone
In this section, we try to find the optimal capital structure dt if the bank manager
maximizes the payoff level to bank capitalists, depositors, and bank managers in the
AF model. The objective of the bank manager becomes:
1
2h
∫ Rtdt−RAt
−h
(1− c)(RAt + xt+1)QtLtdxt+1 +
1
2h
∫ h
Rtdt−RAt
(RAt + xt+1)QtLtdxt+1. (3.77)
Given the bank capital Bt in the bank, the total bank asset can be expressed as QtLt =
1
1−dtBt. Substituting in into the objective yields
1
2h
[∫ Rtdt−RAt
−h
(1− c)(RAt + xt+1)dxt+1 +
∫ h
Rtdt−RAt
(RAt + xt+1)dxt+1
]
1
1− dtBt. (3.78)
We divide the space of dt into the following different intervals:
(1). When Rtdt −RAt < −h, i.e., 0 < dt < R
A
t −h
Rt
, the objective function becomes:
Bt
1
2h
[∫ h
−h
(RAt + xt+1)dxt+1
]
1
1− dt . (3.79)
It is an increasing function of dt, as Bt
1
2h
[∫ h
−h(R
A
t + xt+1)dxt+1
]
is not a function of dt
and 1
1−dt is increasing in dt.
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(2). When −h < Rtdt −RAt < h, i.e., R
A
t −h
Rt
< dt < 1
13, the objective function is shown
in Eq. (3.77). We can simplify it as follows:
Bt
2h
[∫ h
−h
(RAt + xt+1)dxt+1 − c
∫ Rtdt−RAt
−h
(RAt + xt+1)dxt+1
]
1
1− dt
=
Bt
2h
[
2hRAt − cRAt (Rtdt −RAt + h)−
c
2
[(Rtdt −RAt )2 − h2]
] 1
1− dt
=
Bt
2h
[ c
2
h2 + (2− c)hRAt +
c
2
(RAt )
2 − c
2
R2td
2
t
] 1
1− dt . (3.80)
Differentiate it with respect to dt yields
Bt
2h(1− dt)2
[
−cR2tdt(1− dt) +
c
2
h2 + (2− c)hRAt +
c
2
(RAt )
2 − c
2
R2td
2
t
]
.
Further,
c
2
R2td
2
t − cR2tdt +
c
2
h2 + (2− c)hRAt +
c
2
(RAt )
2
=
c
2
R2t (1− dt)2 +
c
2
h2 + (2− c)hRAt +
c
2
(RAt )
2 − c
2
R2t > 0. (3.81)
We can see that the above first derivative is positive when RAt > Rt. To sum up, the
case (1) and (2) show that banks would fancy higher deposit ratio when their objective
is to maximize the payoff of bank capitalists, depositors and bank managers, and it
does not have an interior solution.
3.6.5 Maximization Problem of Bankers in the Modified Model
Bankers maximize (3.38) subject to bank capital accumulation (3.39) and the moral
hazard constraint (3.40). First, we rewrite (3.39) as:
f(Bt, Bt−1) = [(RAt + xt −Rt)γt−1 +Rt]Bt−1 −Bt = 0, (3.82)
13We know that
RAt +h
Rt
> 1, and we don’t consider the case when dt > 1.
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The Lagrangian is constructed as
L3 = Et
{ ∞∑
τ=t+1
(1− θ)θτ−t−1Ξt,τ [Bτ + Ωτf(Bt, Bt−1)]
}
. (3.83)
The first order condition with respect to Bt+1 is:
EtΩt+1 = 1− θ + θEtΞt+1,t+2Ωt+2[(RAt+2 −Rt+2)γt+1 +Rt+2]. (3.84)
Changing the notations as follows:
µt = EtΞt,t+1Ωt+1(RAt −Rt), (3.85)
νt = EtΞt,t+1Ωt+1Rt, (3.86)
the FOC (3.84) becomes
Ωt+1 = 1− θ + θ(γt+1µt+1 + νt+1). (3.87)
The value function of bankers is
Vt = Et(Ξt,t+1,Ωt+1, Bt+1),
= EtΞt,t+1Ωt+1
[
(RAt −Rt)γt +Rt
]
Bt,
= (γtµt + νt)Bt. (3.88)
Given the value function form, we can incorporate the the moral hazard constraint:
L3 = Vt(nt) + λt [Vt −ΘQtLt] . (3.89)
The FOC with respect to λt is:
γt =
νt
Θ− µt . (3.90)
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